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Shareholder bylaws that limit or direct board action raise tough and
fascinating questions of both statutory interpretation under state law and an
important policy matter. In particular, over the last decade shareholders have
sought to use bylaws to limit poison pills and to grant shareholders access to
the corporate proxy materials to nominate directors. This paper argues that an
expansive, although not unlimited, shareholder power to enact bylaws is both a
plausible interpretation of Delaware's statutory scheme and desirable as a
policy matter. Shareholder bylaws that set general rules of corporate
governance and procedure should be valid unless more specific statutory
provisions remove a specific matter from the bylaw power. Applied to poison
pill and proxy access bylaws, both are valid under the general analysis,
although poison pill bylaws may not be valid due to a more specific provision
of Delaware law. The SEC should require boards to include bylaw proposals
unless the particular proposal is clearly invalid under relevant state law.
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Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and
Poison Pills
I. INTRODUCTION
As large institutional investors own a larger percentage of American public
corporations, some of those investors have become more active and have tried
to ,hange corporate governance practices at companies they believe are poorly
run. This often has taken the form of shareholder proposals suggesting specific
changes.
Although traditionally shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8 have been
mere suggestions, some shareholders have made proposals in the form of
bylaws which, if valid, would legally bind boards of directors. Two particularly
significant kinds of bylaw proposals have been poison pill and proxy access
bylaws. Poison pill bylaws limit the ability of a board to maintain or enact a
poison pill, a leading antitakeover defense. Proxy access bylaws allow certain
shareholders, under specified circumstances, to have their nominees for director
positions included in the corporation's proxy materials.'
Shareholder bylaws limiting or directing board action raise a tough and
fascinating question of statutory interpretation. Every state has a statute
2allowing shareholders to enact bylaws concerning firm governance, but every
state also has a statute granting the board of directors broad authority to govern
the corporation.3 Each state also has many more specific corporate governance
statutes that grant or do not grant authority to set rules on specific points in
bylaws. Resolving the tensions among these statutes is quite hard, and has
generated much scholarly debate.
I will engage in a detailed analysis of the many statutory provisions
touching on bylaw power, and argue that shareholder bylaws regulating general
matters of corporate governance and procedure should be valid under Delaware
law, which is typical of most state law on this point.4 Applying this analysis to
poison pill and proxy access bylaws, both should be valid under the general
analysis, although a more particular statute concerning rights and options on
1. For further background on shareholder amendments, particularly poison pill and proxy access
bylaws, see infra Part II.
2. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2005); MOD. Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.20(a) (1984).
3. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2005); MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1984).
4. The basic position I advocate is close to that set out in John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield:
Can Institutions Change the Outcome of Corporate Control Contests?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 605 (1997).
I provide greater textual support for that position, in response to the leading textual analysis to date of
the question, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws:
Taking Back the Street?, 73 TuL. L. REv. 409 (1998), which I argue takes an overly narrow view of the
bylaw power.
Berkeley Business Law Journal
shares creates significant doubt concerning poison pill bylaws. 5 1 further argue
that Delaware case law is consistent with this textual analysis of the statutes.
6
Shareholder bylaws raise tough questions of policy as well as of corporate
law. Indeed, the policy and legal issues are inter-related: policy concerns do
and should inform judicial decisions, and the case law in turn helps shape our
understanding of the relevant policy goals. I will analyze the policy dilemma
and conclude that shareholder bylaws regulating corporate governance are
desirable. Key to the analysis is noting that the bylaw debate solely concerns
how a default rule is set; corporations will be able to vary the rule whichever
way courts decide. Thus, if courts hold that the statutes grant shareholders
broad power to set corporate governance rules, corporations can limit that
power in the certificate of incorporation. Conversely, if courts hold that statutes
grant shareholders only narrow bylaw power, corporations can give
shareholders greater authority in the certificate. Many thoughtful objections to
expansive shareholder power to initiate corporate rules do not apply to a default
rule that shareholders and directors can limit if they choose. Within this limited
context, a default rule of broad shareholder power to enact bylaws concerning
corporate governance is best, given shareholder ability to evaluate such general
rules and given the danger of allowing boards to veto attempts to limit their
own authority. Moreover, it is easier for corporations to contract around a broad
bylaw default rule than a narrow rule, as contracting around the statutory
default occurs through amendments to the certificate of incorporation, and only
the board (which tends to prefer a narrow bylaw power) has the power to
initiate changes to the certificate.
7
Even if one agrees that expansive bylaw power is both valid under state law
and desirable, a practical analysis of shareholder bylaws cannot end there.
Favorable state court rules will be worthless to shareholders unless they can use
the corporate proxy materials to propose bylaws. Creating and circulating
proxy materials of their own is almost always prohibitively expensive unless
shareholders are seeking to gain a controlling share block. The SEC's Rule
14a-8 governs when boards are required to include shareholder proposals in the
corporation's proxy materials; hence the interpretation of that rule becomes
quite important for our subject. Although the SEC staff has wobbled some over
time (including recent months), its usual approach has been to allow boards to
exclude both poison pill and proxy access bylaws. I argue that both as a matter
of corporate governance and as a matter of comity, the SEC should require
boards to include both types of bylaw proposals. That approach would allow
greater experimentation both among corporations and among states. Indeed,
allowing shareholder proxy access bylaws would be a wiser course than
5. See infra Part III.A.
6. See infra Part III.B.
7. See infra Part IV.
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proceeding with the one-size-fits-all proxy access rule that the SEC has
proposed amidst great controversy.
8
II. BACKGROUND
The growth of more activist institutional investors over the last few
decades 9 has led to more use of shareholder-passed bylaws as a way to restrain
boards or empower shareholders. Bylaws are one of the two main private
documents defining a corporation's governance structure and procedure. The
certificate (or article, in some states) of incorporation is the other. Institutional
investors have looked to amending the bylaws rather than the certificate
because although the certificate takes precedence over the bylaws if the two
conflict, shareholders alone can amend the bylaws, while only the board has the
power to initiate amendments to the certificate, which shareholders must then
approve.
Two sets of shareholder campaigns in particular have gained attention. In
the nineties shareholders tried to enact bylaws limiting the ability of boards to
adopt and maintain poison pills. In the last few years shareholders tried to enact
bylaws requiring corporations to include shareholder nominees to the board in
the corporate proxy under certain circumstances.
A. Poison Pill Bylaws
The poison pill is the most potent of antitakeover defenses. If a corporation
has a poison pill and a hostile bidder acquires enough of the corporation's
shares to trigger the pill, other shareholders will have the right to buy more
shares at below-market prices, meaning that the bidder must buy those shares
as well. Alternatively, the pill could trigger the right to purchase more shares of
the bidder at low prices after a merger has occurred, diluting the value of the
bidder's current shareholdings.
Conventional wisdom is that the presence of an unredeemed poison pill
makes a takeover prohibitively expensive for the bidder.' 0 A bidder may try to
elect new board members who will redeem the pill, but a staggered board
combined with a prohibition on removing directors without cause means that it
will take over a year for such a strategy to succeed.1 There is debate over
whether blocking hostile bids helps shareholders by increasing the company's
8. See infra Part V.
9. See Bernard Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L.
REv. 1277 (1991); Edmund B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991).
10. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory,
Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REv. 887 (2002). But cf William J. Carney, The Illusory Protections
of the Poison Pill, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 179 (2003).
11. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 10.
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ability to bargain for a higher price1 2 or hurts them by allowing the incumbent
board to entrench itself. 13 The latter view predominates among many corporate
law scholars. Shareholder activists appear to hold the latter view as well, and
thus would like to limit the ability of boards to put and keep pills in place.
Bylaws are about the only way that shareholders can initiate binding actions
in corporate policy. Thus, shareholders turned to bylaws as a way to limit
poison pills once it became clear that courts were going to allow boards to
create and keep in place all but the most powerful of poison pills. In the
nineties a growing number of shareholders introduced shareholder proposals
that would enact such bylaws. Some bylaws required boards to redeem existing
pills under certain circumstances, 14 while others required shareholder approval
for putting new pills in place.' 5 As institutional investors increasingly exercised
their voting power, such corporate governance proposals gradually received
more favorable votes. There is, however, a considerable question as to whether
such poison pill bylaws are valid under state law. Two state courts did consider
this issue in the late nineties. The Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld a poison
pill bylaw in Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters General Fund v. Fleming
Companies.16 A federal district court interpreting Georgia law struck down a
poison pill bylaw in Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Technologies, Inc. 17
Right around the time of Fleming, the SEC decided that boards could
choose to exclude poison pill bylaws. 18 To enact a bylaw in a public
corporation, shareholders need to obtain the proxy voting power for a majority
of the shares voting. Distributing a proxy on one's own is generally
prohibitively expensive, costing at minimum in the hundreds of thousands of
dollars. Even large institutional investors are not willing to expend that kind of
money on corporations in which they own at most only a few percent of the
outstanding shares. They will be willing to propose bylaws only if they can do
so through the corporation's own proxy solicitation material that it sends to
shareholders at the company's expense.
The SEC's rules govern when boards are required to include shareholder
proposals in the corporation's proxy materials. Once the SEC decided to allow
boards to exclude poison pill bylaws, the chances of such bylaws being
proposed and passed fell to essentially zero. That is where things now stand,
12. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover
Charter Provisions as Pre-Commitment, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (2003).
13. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981).
14. See PLM Int'l, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 575 (Apr. 28, 1997).
15. See Union Carbide Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 145 (Feb. 5,
1999).
16. 975 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1999).
17. 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
18. See infra Part V.
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and will continue to stand unless and until the SEC changes its mind.
B. Shareholder Nomination Bylaws
Shareholders elect directors. However, in the vast majority of instances it is
the current board that nominates the directors and includes its nominees in the
corporation's proxy materials. It is too expensive for shareholders to circulate
their own proxy materials, unless they are trying to obtain a controlling amount
of shares, in which case the potential profits from achieving control may be
large enough to justify waging a proxy contest if it will help gain control.
Boards will generally (indeed, almost uniformly) not include shareholder
nominees that they do not want in the corporation's proxy materials unless the
SEC were to force them to do so.
One potential way around this is to enact a bylaw that requires the board to
include shareholder nominees in the corporation's proxy materials if specified
conditions are met. Such bylaws may or may not be valid under state law.
However, in order to test that law, shareholders must first be able to pass such
proxy access bylaws, and in order to be able to effectively pass such bylaws
they must be able to get the bylaw proposal included in the company's proxy
materials. Here again, the SEC has not helped shareholders, and has generally
allowed corporations to exclude proxy access bylaws, with a few exceptions.
1 9
A few years ago, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees Pension Plan tried again with a series of proxy access bylaws at
various companies. The SEC allowed the companies to exclude the proposals,2 °
but it announced that it was reconsidering proxy access for shareholder
nominees.2 1 Several months later the SEC staff produced a report that examined
22
various options for reform of the nomination process. One possible reform
was to allow proxy access bylaws.
23
The most controversial proposal would create a requirement to include
shareholder nominees in corporate proxy materials under specified
circumstances. 24 The SEC followed up on this suggestion with proposed Rule
14a- 11. 25 The rule would require companies to include certain shareholder
nominees if one of two triggers applied. The first trigger is that at least 35% of
19. See infra notes 301-02 and accompanying text.
20. See Staff Report: Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the Nomination and Election of
Directors, July 15, 2003, p. 1 [hereinafter Staff Report].
21. See Commission to Review Current Proxy Rules and Regulations to Improve Corporate
Democracy, Press Release No. 2003-46 (Apr. 14, 2003).
22. See Staff Report, supra note 20.
23. See Alternative E, Staff Report, supra note 20, at 24-26.
24. See Alternative A, Staff Report, supra note 20, at 6-14.
25. See Release No. 34-48626, Proposed Rule: Security Holder Director Nominations, Oct. 14,
2003.
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shareholders withhold support for a board nominee. 26 The second trigger is that
a majority of shareholders vote to be governed by the 14a- 11 regime.27 Only
shareholders who collectively have held at least 5% of the outstanding shares
for at least two years could nominate shareholders using the rule.28
Shareholders could only nominate between one and three directors, depending
on how many positions are up for election, and in all events less than a majority
of the positions up for a vote.29 The proposed rule has been controversial,
generating thousands of comment letters.30 As of this writing, the rule has not
yet been adopted and it appears to be dead.
In the meantime, the SEC's staff has wobbled on the question of whether
companies must include shareholder proxy access bylaw proposals. In
December 2004 the staff initially denied a no-action request by Disney, which
wanted to exclude a proxy access bylaw submitted by AFSCME, the New York
State Common Retirement Fund, CalPERS, and the Illinois State Board of
Investment. 3 1 The proposal would subject Disney to the proposed Rule 14a- 1
regime. A few weeks later the staff reversed itself, allowing Disney to exclude
the proposal and thus reverting to its traditional position. 32 The union plans to
appeal the staffs decision to the Commission. 33
This brief account of the background for shareholder bylaws suggests that
both state law and SEC rules are important to the practical possibilities of
bylaws for empowering shareholders, and we shall consider both below. It also
suggests that shareholder bylaws are both controversial and potentially
effective at shifting the balance of power between boards and shareholders, and
raise interesting policy questions as well.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF BYLAWS
This section analyzes existing Delaware law to determine what sorts of
provisions bylaws can validly contain. The analysis both provides a general
framework for assessing the validity of bylaw provisions, and applies that
framework to shareholder proxy access and poison pill bylaws. It focuses on
Delaware as the leading corporate law jurisdiction, although a similar question
arises in other states.
Bill Eskridge and Phil Frickey have suggested a general framework for
26. See proposed Rule 14a-I I(a)(2)(i).
27. See proposed Rule 14a-1 l(a)(2)(ii).
28. See proposed Rule 14a-I 1(b).
29. See proposed Rule 14a-I 1(d).
30. These letters are available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s7l903.shtml.
31. See The Walt Disney Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 863 (December 8,
2004).
32. See Carrie Johnson, SEC Staff Reverses on Disney Proxy; Ballot Won't Include Nomination
Initiative, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2004, at El.
33. See id.
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understanding statutory interpretation as practical reasoning. 34 Their approach
recognizes several major sources of authority. They suggest a funnel as a
heuristic device for understanding the relationship between these sources. At
the bottom of the funnel is the narrowest and most authoritative source: the
statutory text itself. In the middle of the funnel are such factors as legislative
history, administrative interpretations, and judicial interpretations-less
authoritative and more wide-ranging than statutory text. At the top of the funnel
are policy considerations, the least authoritative but most wide-ranging source
for interpreting statutes. These three levels of analysis link to each other: the
policy analysis of Part IV ties to broad themes that emerge from the case law,
and that case law is anchored in the statutory text. In this section I consider the
lowest and middle levels of the funnel. The first sub-section focuses on
statutory text. The second sub-section considers the legislative history of the
Delaware statutes and relevant judicial decisions that affect the analysis. Part
IV engages in a policy analysis, the top of the funnel.
A. Text
We start our analysis with two conflicting statutory provisions in
Delaware.35 Delaware section 141(a) is the statutory source for a strong
presumption in favor of board discretionary control over the business affairs of
a corporation. It provides:
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation. If any such
provision is made in the certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties
conferred or imposed upon the board of directors by this chapter shall be exercised
or performed to such extent and by such person or persons as shall be provided in
• . • 36
the certificate of incorporation.
The competing provision is section 109(b), which gives a broad sweep to
what bylaws may cover:
The bylaws may contain any provision, not inconsistent with law or with the
certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct
of its affairs, and its rights or Fwer or the rights or powers of its stockholders,
directors, officers or employees.
As noted by Jeffrey Gordon, there is a frustrating circularity here, what he
34. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990).
35. Similar conflicting provisions exist in most if not all other states. See, e.g., MOD. Bus. ACT §§
10.20(a), 8.01(b) (1984).
36. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2005) (emphasis added).
37. Id § 109(b) (emphasis added).
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calls a "recursive loop. ' 38 One can read the phrase "except as may be otherwise
provided in this chapter" in section 141(a) as referring, among other things, to
section 109(b), so that section 109(b) trumps section 141 (a). Alternatively, one
can read the phrase "not inconsistent with law" in section 109(b) as referring,
among other things, to section 141(a), so that section 141(a) trumps section
109(b).3 9
This gives rise to three basic possible readings. First, section 109(b) does
not on its own validate any sort of bylaw provision, because section 141(a)
always trumps it. Second, section 141 (a) does not provide any sort of limitation
whatsoever on the provisions that section 109(b) allows, because section 109(b)
always trumps 141(a). Third, one can split the difference so that section 109(b)
does allow for some limitations on matters that otherwise would be subject to
board authority, but section 141(a) limits how far such bylaw provisions can
go. The question then arises as to how to split the difference.
Does the statutory text give us any sorts of clues as to which of these three
possible readings makes most sense of the two provisions? We are guided by
the general principle that wherever possible, we should read different statutes
together harmoniously, such that effect is given to all provisions. This is the
general principle of textualist interpretation that the Delaware courts have
specifically endorsed. 40 Also relevant is the Delaware doctrine of independent
legal significance. 41 Under this doctrine, "action taken pursuant to the authority
of the various sections of [the Delaware General Corporation Law] constitute
acts of independent legal significance and their validity is not dependent on
other sections of the Act. ', 2 Moreover, we shall not consider only sections
141(a) and 109(b). Rather, we shall bring in the broader statutory context and
consider a number of other statutes that bear on bylaws and board power.
Our basic principle, that sections 141(a) and 109(b) should both be given
38. Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Just Say Never? " Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted
Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 546 (1997).
39. Note that the § 109(b) exception refers to "law" generally, not the corporation law specifically,
unlike § 141 (a)'s exception, which refers to "except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter," i.e.,
in the corporation law. Thus, one could argue that the § 109(b) exception really only refers to other sorts
of legal limitations--e.g., that the bylaws may not discriminate on the basis of race, or may not violate
the antitrust laws. This weakly suggests that § 109(b) trumps § 141(a). However, although "law" does
include more than the corporation law, it would seem to include the corporation law as well.
40. See Henley Group, Inc. v. Santa Fe S. Pac. Corp., No. CIV. A. 9569, 1988 WL 23945, at *16
(Del. Ch. Apr. 12, 1998) ("[T]he relevant principle of statutory construction is that a statute must be
interpreted to give full effect to the pertinent statutory language and to produce the most consistent and
harmonious result. A court should not normally use rules of construction to amend or override one
statutory provision in favor of another, and statutes on the same subject must be construed together so
that effect is given to every provision. The Court will choose between statutory provisions only if there
is an irreconcilable conflict between the two statutes, in which case the later enacted statute supercedes
the earlier one.").
41. See Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963); Fed. United Corp. v. Havender, II
A.2d 331 (Del. 1940).
42. Langfelder v. Universal Lab., 68 F. Supp. 209, 211 (D. Del. 1946).
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the fullest effect possible, already provides a strong argument in favor of the
third reading. The first reading, that section 109(b) can never on its own
validate any bylaw provision, in effect makes all of section 109(b) null. We
should read section 109(b) as having some sort of effect: it should make some
bylaw provisions valid that would in its absence not be valid. The most
impressive textual analysis of this issue to date, that of Lawrence Hamermesh,
comes at least very close to falling afoul of this objection.43
Similarly, the second reading, that section 141(a) puts no limits on section
109(b), seems to make one part of section 141(a) superfluous. This second
reading hinges on understanding the "except as may be otherwise provided in
this chapter" language of section 141(a) as referring to section 109(b), among
other statutory provisions. However, note that this exception language more
fully reads "except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its
certificate of incorporation." The difficulty arises when we add in
consideration of section 102(b)(1), which allows the certificate to contain
provisions concerning management of the business and affairs of the
corporation.44 Section 102(b)(1) is similar in scope to section 109(b). If we are
to read section 109(b) broadly to allow bylaws to limit board authority, then
section 102(b)(1) would have the same effect. However, since section 102 is in
the same chapter as section 109 and section 141, the "except as may be
otherwise provided in this chapter" phrase would then point to 102(b)(1) as
well as 109(b). If that is so, though, then why would the exception need to
include "or in its certificate of incorporation"? The certificate language in
section 141(a)'s exception clause thus becomes superfluous on the second,
broad reading of section 109(b).45
An expressio unius argument reinforces this last point. Section 141(a)'s
exception clause refers to provisions in the certificate but not in the bylaws. If
43. Hamermesh says "it is preferable to read section 141(a) as an absolute preclusion against by-
law limits on director management authority, in the absence of explicit statutory authority for such limits
outside of section 109(b)." Hamermesh, supra note 4, at 444. At other points, Hamermesh says "the
most reasonable reading of these statutes precludes reliance on section 109(b) as an independent source
of authority for a by-law that directly limits the managerial power of the board of directors." Id. at 430
(emphasis added). Similarly, he says "stockholders lack the general authority to adopt by-laws that
directly limit the managerial power of directors." Id. at 479 (emphasis added). The language I have
emphasized in the last two quotes suggests that Hamermesh may think that § 109(b) authorizes indirect
limits on board authority, which would give some effect to § 109(b), although Hamermesh does not
elaborate on the direct/indirect distinction. I shall discuss this a bit more below.
44. Section 102(b)(l) reads:
[T]he certificate of incorporation may also contain... [a]ny provision for the management of
the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any provision creating,
defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the
stockholders, or any class of the stockholders, or the members of a nonstock corporation; if
such provisions are not contrary to the laws of this State. Any provision which is required or
permitted by any section of this chapter to be stated in the bylaws may instead be stated in the
certificate of incorporation.
§ 102(b)(1) (2005).
45. See Hamermesh, supra note 4, at 431-32.
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the bylaws can indeed limit section 141(a), this would have been a natural place
to mention the bylaws, but the statute does not do so. Expressio unius is a
commonly-used but rather controversial textual argument. It is not always safe
to assume that legislators will have seen that a certain provision could have
been inserted and deliberately chose not to. Many absences of this sort are
inadvertent. However, in this case the argument is strengthened by the fact that
in many other related parts of the Delaware statutes the language refers to the
certificate and bylaws together. In section 141 alone this occurs at least seven
46times.
Both the first and the second readings run afoul of some strong textualist
objections. This provides at least a negative argument for the third, split-the-
difference reading. The split-the-difference reading does give effect to the
"except as may be otherwise provided . . . in its certificate of incorporation"
language of section 141(a). The split the difference reading only allows some
bylaw provisions under section 109(b); section 141(a) forbids other bylaws.
Absent the reference to the certificate in section 141 (a), the same might be true
for certificate provisions limiting board authority. The inclusion of the
certificate exception, though, means that the certificate may limit board
authority in any way, regardless of the usual grant of authority to the board in
section 141(a).47 Thus, certificate limitations can go further than bylaw
limitations.
Is there any more positive support for that reading? That depends in part on
how one proposes to split the difference. The literature contains several
possible distinctions for what bylaws can and cannot do under section 109(b),
48most of them set out in an article by John Coffee. The four distinctions Coffee
suggests are as follows:
Ordinary versus fundamental matters. Bylaws may be more likely to be
valid if they concern fundamental rather than ordinary matters. This distinction
tracks how the SEC has understood state law in its handling of shareholder
proposals. Lawrence Hamermesh objects that fundamental matters are precisely
the area where a board's role is most important, and that in practice much of a
board's work is focused on fundamental matters.49 This proposed distinction
would not divest managers of default authority over fundamental matters; it
would simply allow bylaws to limit that default board power. The
ordinary/fundamental distinction gets some backup from statutorily required
shareholder voting: besides electing directors, shareholders have the right to
46. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(b), 141(c), 141(d), 141(f), 141(g), 141(h), 141(i) (2005).
47. Of course, there are some legal limits on what the certificate may do, just not limits derived
from § 141(a).
48. See Coffee, supra note 4.
49. See Hamermesh, supra note 4, at 433-35.
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vote on mergers,50 sales of substantially all corporate assets, 51 dissolutions,52
and certificate amendments. 53 These are all fundamental matters, thus
suggesting that the Delaware statutes tend to give shareholders voting power
over fundamental matters, but not otherwise.
54
Affirmative orders versus negative constraints. Bylaws might be valid if
they constrain the board, but not if they affirmatively order it to take specific
actions. Coffee seems to have derived this distinction from case law rather than
statutory language.55 Section 141(a) speaks of corporate business being
"managed by or under the direction of' the board. The word "manage" may
connote affirmatively taking action. Perhaps "relating to" connotes negative
constraint on action. However, I do not see why the phrase "relating to" should
refer only to bylaws that constrain board action-the words "relating to" do not
seem to suggest that distinction.
Procedure versus substance. Bylaws usually seem to focus on procedural
rules rather than substantive matters. 56 The language of sections 141(a) and
109(b) does not particularly suggest this distinction, although this might be
another way of helping to distinguish "manage" and "relating to." The
distinction does, however, emerge as a possible way of understanding the list of
specific bylaw provisions that other parts of the corporate law allow, so I shall
reserve discussion of this distinction until we come to that list.
Corporate governance versus business decisions. Coffee terms the "safest
and soundest distinction" that between corporate governance, a valid subject
for bylaws, and business decisions, which are reserved to the board.57
Corporate governance bylaws "affect the allocation of power between
shareholders and directors prospectively (particularly with regard to a broad
and generically defined class of cases.), 58 This may help make sense of the
"managed by" versus "relating to" language. Section 109(b) also speaks of
provisions relating to the "rights or powers" of stockholders, directors, officers
or employees. The phrase "rights or powers" seems to point to structural,
governance matters as opposed to business decisions.
59
Hamermesh suggests a fifth possible distinction for distinguishing valid
50. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2005).
51. See id. §271.
52. See id. § 275.
53. See id. § 242.
54. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 613-14.
55. See id. at 614.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 614-15.
58. Id. at 614.
59. Even Hamermesh agrees that bylaws directed at specific business decisions are "less
defensible," although he believes that even broad corporate governance bylaws are hard to defend.
However, his objections to this distinction are really aimed not at the distinction itself, but rather at
whether poison pill bylaws fall on the corporate governance side of the distinction. See Hamermesh,
supra note 4, at 437-42.
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from invalid bylaw provisions:
Direct versus indirect. Bylaw provisions that indirectly limit board
managerial authority may be allowable. 60 The "relating to" language of section
109(b) may provide some support for this distinction. However, it is far from
clear how one would make the direct/indirect distinction in practice.
Thus, the statutory language that we have considered so far seems most
consistent with a split-the-difference interpretation that gives effect to both
sections 109(b) and 141(a) by distinguishing bylaws that section 109(b) allows
from bylaws that section 141(a) forbids. The language supports several ways of
making this distinction, with the corporate governance/business decision
distinction receiving the most support.
Many other provisions of the Delaware General Corporation Law touch on
the allocation of power between boards and shareholders and how the
certificate and bylaws may affect that allocation. We should consider those
provisions and see which approach they tend to support.
The Delaware General Corporation Law contains several other provisions
that allow for broad constraints on the board's management authority. Of most
interest to us here is section 350, which allows for shareholder agreements that
may restrict the board's authority in close corporations. Section 350 reads as
follows:
A written agreement among the stockholders of a close corporation holding a
majority of the outstanding stock entitled to vote, whether solely among themselves
or with a party not a stockholder, is not invalid, as between the parties to the
agreement, on the ground that it so relates to the conduct of the business and affairs
of the corporation as to restrict or interfere with the discretion or power of the board
of directors. The effect of any such agreement shall be to relieve the directors and
impose upon the stockholders who are parties to the agreement the liability for
managerial acts or omissions which is imposed on directors to the extent and so
long as the discretion or powers of the board in its management of corporate affairs
is controlled by such agreement.
62
Section 350 clearly allows shareholder agreements to limit board authority
in close corporations, and is thus one of the sections that the "except as may be
otherwise provided in this chapter" proviso of section 141 (a) refers to. Section
350 may show how a statute can be specifically drafted to provide for broad
permission to limit management authority under section 141(a). The fact that
section 350 is limited to close corporations may suggest that shareholders alone
should not be able to limit board authority outside the close corporation
60. See supra note 43 for relevant passages.
61. Close corporations, as defined in Delaware, must have no more than thirty shareholders, have
transfer restrictions on their shares, and have made no public offering of their shares. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 342 (2005).
62. Id. § 350.
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context, as a broad interpretation of section 109(b) would allow. Both sections
109(b) and 350 refer to the business and affairs of the corporation and the
powers of the board. Section 350 does more specifically refer to restricting or
interfering with the powers of the board, whereas section 109(b) refers more
generally to anything relating to the business or affairs or powers. However,
given the breadth of powers that section 141 (a) grants to the board, it is hard to
see how any bylaw provision that relates to board power authorized under
section 109(b) could do anything other than restrict board power.
The other provisions that allow for shifting of power from the board are
sections 226, which allows the Court of Chancery to appoint a custodian or
63receiver where the directors and shareholders are badly divided, and section
351, which provides that the certificate of a close corporation may provide that
shareholders shall manage the business of the corporation.64 The fact that
section 351 does not specify that bylaws may provide for shareholder
management is some evidence against a broad reading of section 109(b). Many
provisions contain more specific rules allocating power between boards and
shareholders.
A number of provisions allow for bylaws to set the rules:
Bylaws may set the number of directors, require that directors must be
stockholders, set qualifications for directors, and set a quorum for board
action.
65
Bylaws may set board committee quora and specify the powers of
committees.
6 6
Initial bylaws or bylaws adopted by shareholders may create staggered
boards. 67 The fact that board-adopted bylaws cannot create staggered boards is
of note.
Bylaws may restrict the ability of the board to act by written consent.
68
Bylaws may restrict the ability of the board to meet outside of Delaware.69
Bylaws may restrict the ability of the board to set director compensation.
70
Bylaws may restrict the ability of the board to meet by phone or similar
communications.7
Bylaws may specify officer titles and duties.72
Bylaws may specify the terms and manner of choosing officers.
73
63. See id. § 226.
64. See id. §351.
65. Seeid. § 141(b).
66. See id. § 141(c).
67. Seeid. § 141(d).
68. See id. § 141(f).
69. See id. § 141(g).
70. Seeid § 141(h).
71. Seeid. § 141(i).
72. See id. § 142(a).
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74Bylaws may specify the manner for filling officer vacancies.
Bylaws may create indemnification rights.
75
Corporations may in their bylaws opt out of section 203, the Delaware
business combination statute.
76
Bylaws may set the location for shareholder meetings.
77
Bylaws may set the date and time for shareholder meetings.
78
Bylaws may specify persons who can call special stockholder meetings.
79
Bylaws may set the quorum for stockholder meetings.80
Bylaws may require notice of adjourned stockholder meetings. 81
Bylaws may provide for how to fill board vacancies.
82
Some provisions, however, mention the certificate but not the bylaws as a
method for setting certain rules. These include:
The certificate may give a class of stockholders the right to elect one or
more directors.
83
The certificate in a corporation not authorized to issue capital stock may
provide that less than one-third of the members of the governing body may
constitute a quorum.
84
The certificate may allow removal of directors without cause in
corporations with staggered boards.
85
The certificate may provide for rights and limitations on classes of stock.86
The certificate may provide for dividend rights for classes of stock.
87
The certificate may provide for rights upon dissolution for classes of
stock.8 8
The certificate may provide for the convertibility of classes of stock.89
The certificate may regulate the creation and issuance of rights and options
respecting stock.90
73. See id § 142(b).
74. See id. § 142(e).
75. See id. § 145(f).
76. See id. § 203(b).
77. Seeid. §211(a).
78. See id. § 211 (b).
79. See id. § 211 (d).
80. See id. §§ 215(c),216.
81. See id. § 222(c).
82. See id. § 223.
83. See id. § 141(d).
84. See id. § 1410).
85. See id. § 141(k)(1).
86. See id. § 151(a).
87. See id. § 151(c).
88. See id. § 151(d).
89. See id. § 151(e).
90. See id. § 157. We shall see that this provision along with the § 151 provisions is of particular
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The certificate may limit the ability of shareholders to act by written
consent.
91
The certificate may provide that elections of directors are not by written
ballot.92
The certificate may vary the one share/one vote rule.
93
The certificate may provide for cumulative voting.
94
The certificate may give bondholders the power to vote "in respect to the
corporate affairs and management of the corporation."
95
The certificate may limit the ability of stockholders to act by written
consent.
96
Does any pattern emerge from this list of statutory provisions? Consider
first the specific provisions that may be included in bylaws. Most of these
provisions focus on rules structuring board decision making,97 the duties and
appointment of officers, 98 and the procedures for shareholder meetings.99 These
provisions seem particularly consistent with the procedure/substance and
corporate governance/business decision distinctions discussed above. Certainly
the board decision making rules of section 141 and the shareholder meeting
rules can be plausibly described as procedural, as can many of the officer-
related provisions of section 142. This distinction does not explain all of the
specific bylaw provisions, though. Indemnification,' 00 the duties of officers, 1° 1
and opting out of the section 203 business combination rule,' ° 2 for instance, do
not obviously fall on the procedural side of the procedure/substance decision.
All of the listed provisions that bylaws may include do seem to fall on the
corporate governance side of the corporate governance/business decision
distinction, but so do many of the listed provisions that can be included in the
certificate but not the bylaws.
Is there any logic to when the Delaware law removes a matter from the
power of bylaws to alter? Some of the provisions would have the potential to
alter the balance of power between the board and shareholders, and in
particular to provide enhanced power to the board. Removing such provisions
from the reach of bylaws may help to protect against overreaching board-
interest with respect to poison pill bylaws.
91. Seeid. §211(b).
92. Seeid. § 211(e).
93. See id. §§ 212(a), 215(b).
94. Seeid. § 214.
95. See id. § 221.
96. See id. § 228.
97. See generally id. § 141.
98. See generally id. § 142.
99. See generally id. §§ 211, 215,216, 222.
100. See id. § 145(f).
101. See id. § 142(a).
102. See id. § 203.
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passed bylaws. I would put the provisions on class directors,' 0 3 removal of
directors, 1 04 action by written consent, 105 and one share/one vote 106 in this
category. Note that shareholder-passed bylaws do not pose a similar threat. In
the case of staggered boards, the statute actually distinguishes between board-
passed and shareholder-passed bylaws, allowing the latter but not the former to
create a staggered board. 10 7 However, the fact that the law makes that
distinction in that section but not the others does weaken the point for those
other sections.
A second category includes the provisions concerning the rights of different
classes of shares. 1°8 It is more of a puzzle why this area is taken out of the
bylaw power. Perhaps the statutory drafters conceived of issuing stock as an
ordinary business decision or substantive matter. Larger corporations issue
shares quite regularly. Issuing shares is a question of corporate finance, and in
some cases also of employee compensation. These are the kinds of business
decisions that fall into the competence of the board. However, defining share
rights can also be an important matter of corporate governance, as poison pills
make very clear. Creation of special classes of shares or rights to receive shares
can be an important form of antitakeover defense. Perhaps here too there was a
fear of the misuse of board-passed bylaws. Or perhaps this use of the power to
issue different types of shares was not as clear and significant at the time these
statutes were created.
A final category of the provisions that cannot be included in bylaws is
miscellaneous. Here I would include cumulative voting 10 9 and bondholder
voting.110 I have no good theory for why these provisions cannot be in the
bylaws. That is not a catastrophic failing, I hope. I am aware of no theory that
perfectly explains the full pattern of what can and cannot be included in the
bylaws. Given the vagaries of legislative drafting of many different provisions
at many different points in time, it is probably asking too much of any
explanation that it fully account for all parts of the law.
Overall, our examination of statutory textual provisions suggests the
following approach to what bylaws may do. Courts should first compare a
bylaw with the statutory provisions that either allow for or exclude bylaws. If
the bylaw falls within one or the other type of specific provision, that provision
prevails."' If the bylaw does not fall squarely within a specific provision, one
103. Seeid. § 141(d).
104. See id. § 141(k)(1).
105. See id. §§ 211(b), 228.
106. See id. § 212(a).
107. Seeid. § 141(d).
108. See id. §§ 151, 157.
109. Seeid §214.
110. Seeid. §221.
111. A common interpretive canon provides that specific statutes should prevail over general
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must move on to general distinctions between valid and invalid bylaws. If in
applying the general distinctions the bylaw seems closely related to one type of
specific statutory provision, those specific provisions and how they treat
bylaws should help guide how one applies the general distinctions. The best
general distinctions between valid and invalid bylaws are those that Coffee has
suggested, with the corporate governance/business decision distinction as the
best, and the procedure/substance and ordinary/fundamental distinctions also
providing some help. No one of these distinctions fully explains the statutory
patterns on its own; courts probably will and should wield several of the
distinctions in attempting to apply the statutes to specific bylaws. Bylaws that
fall on the corporate governance, procedure, and fundamental side of the
distinctions are most likely to be upheld; bylaws that fall on the business,
substance, and ordinary side are most likely to be struck down; and bylaws that
follow a mixed pattern present an intermediate case. 
112
To see how this approach works in practice, let us apply it to shareholder
proxy access bylaws and to poison pill bylaws. Shareholder proxy access
bylaws present the easier case. Shareholder proxy access does not fall squarely
within any specific statutory provision. However, we have seen that bylaws
may set many procedural rules for shareholder meetings, a topic closely related
to proxy access." 3 Moreover, corporate law vests shareholders, and in general
shareholders only, with the power to elect directors." 4 The fundamental power
to elect would seem to carry with it the power to nominate, and in most public
corporations today the power to nominate is effective only if shareholders can
use the corporate proxy.' 15 Indeed, Mel Eisenberg has used this argument,
combined with the ban on using corporate facilities for the personal benefit of
directors, to argue that even in the absence of a bylaw or certificate provision
on point shareholders have the right to use the corporate proxy to nominate
statutes.
112. 1 note a different possible approach, suggested in comments by Larry Solum. One could
distinguish between shareholder-passed and board-passed bylaws, arguing that board-passed bylaws do
not infringe upon the board's section 141(a) prerogatives while shareholder-passed bylaws do. That
point makes a lot of sense, but there are several difficulties. First, in one place where Delaware law
distinguishes between shareholder and board-passed bylaws, it allows the former and not the latter, the
opposite of the suggestion being considered here. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2005). Second,
the Delaware Supreme Court's Quickturn decision, discussed below, invalidating no-hand poison pills,
treats board limits on board power as forbidden under section 141(a). See Quickturn Design Sys. v.
Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998). Third, as a policy matter this suggested approach negates the use of
shareholder bylaws to limit board misbehavior, the key idea that underlies this paper, discussed further
in Part IV.
113. For instance, bylaws may provide for the time and location of shareholder meetings, may
allow a set percentage of shareholders to call for a special meeting, and may set the quorum for
shareholder meetings.
114. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (2005). Unusually, in Delaware the certificate may give
bondholders the right to vote. See id. § 221. Certificates rarely do so, however.
115. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L, REv.
1489, 1505 (1970).
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directors. 116 1 do not need to go that far; I merely argue that bylaws may
provide for shareholder access to the corporate proxy.
Applying the general distinctions as to what bylaws are valid, proxy access
bylaws cover a general matter of corporate governance, not specific business
decisions. They also deal with procedure rather than substance. Thus, on the
two most important criteria, proxy access bylaws appear valid. It is less clear
whether they are a fundamental or ordinary business matter, although given the
central role of shareholder voting in the prevailing justifications of our system
of corporate governance, and given the practical significance of proxy access
for meaningful shareholder voting, it is at least quite arguable that this is a
fundamental matter. The approach suggested by this section's reading of the
statutes suggests that shareholder access bylaws are valid under Delaware law.
Note that while this interpretation of the statutes gives shareholder activists
a new tool against recalcitrant management, it also presents a threat to them as
well. If shareholder bylaws can regulate in this area, then board bylaws can as
well. A board bylaw might regulate the procedure by which shareholders may
propose and approve bylaws. Two possible kinds of board bylaws regulating
the bylaw process come to mind. The first of these is advance notice bylaws,
which require notice a set period of time before a meeting if shareholders
intend to present a proposal at that meeting. This would appear to be the sort of
procedural regulation of shareholder voting that is closely related to explicit
bylaw powers, it qualifies as procedural rather than substantive, and it covers a
matter of general corporate governance. Indeed, such advance notice bylaws
are already common.11 7 There is probably an outer bound to such bylaws. A
notice bylaw that set the notice period too far in advance (say 100 years, to
make the point at the absurd limit) would effectively divest shareholders of
their power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws, in violation of section 109(a). 18
There are also fiduciary duty limits on the ability of boards to enact such a
bylaw-if a Delaware court sees such a bylaw as being enacted for the primary
purpose of disenfranchising shareholders, it will strike it down. 
119
The second type of possible board bylaw would set high barriers for when
shareholder bylaw proposals could be included in the corporate proxy
materials. The main legal challenge to such a bylaw would come not under
state law, but rather under federal securities law, and in particular under Rule
14a-8. Indeed, bylaws which set higher barriers to inclusion of shareholder
bylaws than that rule allows may be invalid for corporations subject to the rule.
116. Seeid. at 1505-08.
117. See Hamermesh, supra note 4, Appendix A.
118. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2005) ("The fact that such power has been so conferred
upon the directors or governing body, as the case may be, shall not divest the stockholders or members
of the power, nor limit their power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws.").
119. See Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000).
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Poison pill bylaws present a tougher case than shareholder proxy access
bylaws. First, poison pill bylaws may be actually covered by two specific
statutory provisions, sections 157 and 151. The Delaware Supreme Court
looked to these two sections in concluding that boards have the right to create
poison pills, although it also pointed to section 141(a) as supplementary
authority.' 2 Section 157 provides that "[s]ubject to any provisions in the
certificate of incorporation, every corporation may create and issue... rights or
options entitling the holders thereof to purchase from the corporation any
shares of its capital stock of any class or classes."' 121 The fact that section 157
allows the certificate but not the bylaws to regulate the creation and issuance of
stock rights is probably the single most powerful argument against poison pill
bylaws. Against this, one can argue that section 157 does not delegate exclusive
authority to the board, saying the corporation may create and issue stock
rights. 22 But even if one accepts that point, the section's language may require
shareholders to act, or to acquire the power to act, through the certificate rather
than through a bylaw. One can also argue that the quoted language allows only
the certificate to limit the basic power to create and issue poison pills, but that
the bylaws may specify procedures that the board must follow, including
requiring shareholder approval, in order to create, amend, or repeal a particular
rights plan.
Section 157 also provides that "[t]he terms upon which, including the time
or times which may be limited or unlimited in duration, at or within which, and
the price or prices at which any shares may be purchased from the corporation
upon the exercise of any such right or option, shall be such as shall be stated in
the certificate of incorporation, or in a resolution adopted by the board of
directors."' 123 Note again the absence of a reference to bylaws. A proponent of
poison pill bylaws can again reply, though, that such bylaws do not specify the
terms of the poison pills; they only specify the procedure by which corporations
can decide to exercise their power to create and issue rights plans.
Poison pill plans are also in some tension with the language of section 151.
Section 151 allows corporations to create different classes and series of shares,
with different powers, rights, and restrictions. These different powers, rights,
and restrictions can be set forth in the certificate or in board resolutions where
the certificate provides for such resolutions. 124 Note the absence of reference to
the bylaws. Here again, poison pill bylaws do not specify the powers, rights, or
restrictions of rights plans, and hence section 151 does not directly govern.
Thus, it is arguable whether section 157 directly prohibits poison pill
120. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1351-53 (Del. 1985).
121. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (2005).
122. The court in Fleming makes this point. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming
Cos., 975 P.2d 907, 911 (Okla. 1999).
123. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (2005).
124. Seeid. § 151.
Berkeley Business Law Journal
bylaws. If it does, that should resolve the question under current law, without
having to consider less specific statutes such as sections 109 and 141. Even if
sections 157 and 151 do not directly resolve the legal issue, they are certainly
closely-enough related to the topic that they should influence how we apply the
general distinctions between valid and invalid bylaws.
Professor Coffee has already applied his distinctions and concluded that
bylaws may require that shareholders must approve future pills, and may
require a shareholder vote to amend, repeal or waive existing pills. Bylaws may
not, however, require the board to redeem an existing pill. 125 Professor
Hamermesh, for instance, has argued that even if phrased in a general,
prospective, way, pill bylaws "would necessarily act principally in respect of a
specific (present or future) takeover effort and thus would not constitute some
general corporate governance rule."'126 A particular shareholder vote, required
by a bylaw, as to whether to create, amend, or repeal a pill at a specific point in
time does indeed look like a specific business decision. However, giving
shareholders the general right to vote on that matter, which is what a pill bylaw
does, is a general matter of corporate governance.
Poison pill bylaws, at least of the type that Coffee sees as valid, also appear
to be procedural rather than substantive: they specify a procedure, namely
shareholder approval, that corporations must follow in order to create, amend,
or repeal a pill. The ordinary/fundamental distinction is again a bit harder to
apply. In form, pills are simply the issuance of rights to purchase shares, an
ordinary business matter, a point Hamermesh emphasizes.12 7 However, their
practical effect, at least in combination with a staggered board and a limit on
removal without cause, is to make hostile takeovers close to impossible, which
is a fundamental matter in corporate governance.
Thus, on the whole at least some poison pill bylaws would seem to fall
within the valid sphere that section 109(b) creates. If sections 157 and 151
referred to bylaws as well as the certificate, I would conclude that prospective
pill bylaws are valid. However, those two specific sections create a strong
argument that poison pills fall within an area that corporations must regulate
using the certificate rather than the bylaws. It is not easy to predict how a court
should or will resolve this question, although on balance I argue that courts
should treat poison bill bylaws as valid. This analysis contrasts with the
analysis of shareholder proxy access bylaws, which we have seen are most
likely valid under the statutory analysis advocated in this subsection.
125. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 615.
126. Hamermesh, supra note 4, at 441.
127. See id.
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B. Legislative History and Judicial Interpretations
Statutory text is the starting point for a legal analysis of the bylaw power,
but it is not the end point. At least where the text contains ambiguities, courts
will typically look to legislative history, judicial interpretations of the relevant
provisions, and administrative agency interpretations as further guides. These
represent moves up within the Eskridge and Frickey funnel. 28 There is no
relevant administrative agency in this area, so that will not help us. There is
some, although not a lot, of relevant legislative history, so we will look at that
first in this sub-section. We will then turn to consider legal cases. Here there is
much material indeed, and Delaware courts are likely to pay a lot of attention to
this material. What follows is a relatively brief overview of the leading caselaw
that is relevant to the matter of the bylaw power.
Variants of both section 141(a) and section 109(b) have been around in the
Delaware statutes for a long time. Section 141(a) began as 21 Del. Laws ch.
273, § 20 in the 1899 Delaware corporation law: "The business of every
corporation organization under the provisions of this Act shall be managed by a
board of not less than three directors, except as hereinafter provided." Note that
at this point the statute did not refer to the certificate as a way to opt out of the
board's broad authority. The reference to the certificate had been added by
1929, when the statute read: "The business of every corporation organized
under the provisions of this Chapter shall be managed by a Board of Directors,
except as hereinafter or in its Certificate of Incorporation otherwise
provided."' 129 The provision remained largely the same through the 1967
rewriting of the Corporation Law, except that "the except as otherwise
provided" proviso is slightly reworded.' 30 The current version of section 141(a)
came into place in 1974, as the language was amended to refer to the "business
and affairs of the corporation" and as it specified that this shall be managed "by
or under the direction of a board of directors.,' 131 For our purposes, the main
points of interest in section 141 (a) were thus in place by 1929.
The bylaw provision also has old ancestors, although its language has
changed somewhat more. In 1874 the Delaware law contained a provision that
"All corporations shall ... be capable ... to make by-laws, consistent with the
laws of the State, for their own government and the management of their
property." '32 In 1915, the provision read: "Every corporation ...shall have
power: ... [to] make by-laws not inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of
128. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 34.
129. 36 Del. Laws ch. 135, § 9 (1929).
130. In the newly-numbered § 141(a), that phrase had taken on its modem wording: "except as may
be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation." 56 Del. Laws ch. 50, § 141 (a)
(1967).
131. 59 Del. Laws ch. 437 (1973) (emphasis added).
132. DEL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 1 (1874).
Berkeley Business Law Journal
the United States or of this State, fixing and altering the number of its directors,
for the management of its property, the regulation and government of its affairs
and for the certification and transfer of its stock., 133 This provision stayed in
place until the current section 109(b) was added in 1967.134 Thus, in 1967 the
bylaw provision went from giving the power to make rules for the management
of property and for the regulation and government of its affairs to the more
indirect current language to make rules that relate to the business of the
corporation. As noted above, this more indirect language in the bylaw provision
helps justify the affirmative versus negative constraint, procedure versus
substance, corporate governance versus business decisions, and direct versus
indirect distinctions. 35 The fact that the bylaw statutory provision was at one
point changed from more indirect language provides some support for the
argument that this distinction matters. 136
Case law can probably provide more insight than the history of the statutory
provisions. There are just two state cases directly on point for poison pill
bylaws, and to my knowledge none for proxy access bylaws. One of those is
the Oklahoma case mentioned earlier, International Brotherhood of Teamsters
General Fund v. Fleming Companies.137 The bylaw in Fleming required
shareholder approval for a poison pill. The relevant Oklahoma law is very close
in language to Delaware law.138 The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the
bylaw was valid. However, its discussion did not focus on the tension between
the analogs of sections 141(a) and 109(b); indeed, it ignored the section 141(a)
analog. Rather, the court focused on the interplay between the analog of section
109(b) and of section 157.139 This immediately reduces the persuasive authority
of the opinion, as most commentators on this topic have focused on the
importance of provisions like section 141(a), and as we shall see, Delaware
courts are likely to do so as well. The Fleming case simply does not speak to
the broad grant of authority to boards that all American corporation laws
contain.
However, Fleming could still be of great interest for our previous statutory
analysis, since section 157 proved there to be the biggest obstacle to poison pill
bylaws.1 40 However, even on this point the case proves disappointing. The main
argument that the Fleming board seems to have made is that the statute
provides that "every corporation may create and issue . . . rights and
133. DEL. CODE 1916 ch. 65, § 2(6) (1915).
134. See Hamermesh, supra note 4, at 451 n. 181.
135. See supra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
136. See Hamermesh, supra note 4, at 451 n. 181.
137. 975 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1999).
138. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2005), with OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1013(b)
(1991).
139. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1038 (1991).
140. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
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options,"' 4 1 which is identical to Delaware's language. 42 The board seems to
have tried to conflate "corporation" with "board of director," a poor argument
which the Oklahoma court easily puts down. However, as we have seen, the
real challenge of section 157 to poison pill bylaws is the expressio unius
argument that the statute makes creation of rights and options subject to
provisions in the certificate, but does not mention provisions in the bylaws.
143
The court does mention that the Fleming board argued that only the certificate
can limit the board's authority to implement a rights plan. 144 The court agreed
that the certificate could limit bylaw power, but noted that the certificate in
Fleming contained no limitation on the issuance of rights or options. 145 Thus
the court failed to grasp the force of the expressio unius point, that rules about
rights or options may only be made in the charter. Accordingly, Fleming
provides incomplete guidance on the statutory scope of bylaw power.
The other state case directly on point, Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne
Technologies, Inc.,146 interprets Georgia law. The Invacare court held that
Georgia law does not allow shareholders to enact a bylaw requiring the board
to remove a continuing director provision in a poison pill. However, the
language of the Georgia statute differs somewhat from the language in
Delaware. The Georgia equivalent to section 157 contains language giving the
board the sole authority to determine the terms of rights, options, and
warrants. 147 The court relied heavily on that language. 148 On the other hand,
other parts of the Georgia statute at the time actually favored shareholder
poison pill bylaws more than Delaware law. For instance, the Georgia analog to
Delaware section 141(a) stated that the board's power to manage the
corporation is "subject to any limitation set forth in the articles of
incorporation, bylaws approved by the shareholders, or agreements among the
shareholders which are otherwise lawful.' ' 149 The court's best rejoinder to the
shareholder-approved bylaw language just cited is that another section of the
Georgia code provided that no agreement by all shareholders, whether
embodied in the articles of incorporation, bylaws, or any written agreement, is
invalid on the grounds that it restricts the board's powers, but that this
provision does not apply to corporations listed on a national securities
141. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., 975 P.2d 907, 911 (Okla. 1999).
142. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (2005).
143. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
144. See Fleming, 975 P.2d at 912.
145. See id.
146. 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
147. Id. at 1580 ("Nothing contained in Section 14-2-601 of this Part shall be deemed to limit the
board of directors' authority to determine, in its sole discretion, the terms and conditions of the rights,
options, or warrants issuable pursuant to this Code section." (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-624(c)
(1997)).
148. See Id. at 1582.
149. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-801(b) (1997).
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exchange. 150 However, Delaware also has no close analog to that language,
although section 350 comes closest. Even in interpreting Georgia law, the use
of the shareholder agreement statutory language to limit the rather clear
language in the analog to section 141(a) allowing shareholder bylaws to limit
board authority is rather dubious. Attempting to apply the court's analysis to
Delaware is even more suspect because of the many differences between the
statutes. Most of the critical statutory language in Georgia is not present in
Delaware. Thus, Invacare provides little help in interpreting Delaware law on
poison pill bylaws.
While Delaware itself has no case directly on point, there are a few cases
with language that comes pretty close to being on point. Perhaps the closest is
Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro.1 5 1 Quickturn struck down a "no
hand" poison pill under which no board could redeem the pill for six months
after taking office if the purpose would be to help an interested person take
control. 152 The Delaware Supreme Court found that this provision restricted the
board's power "in an area of fundamental importance to the shareholders-
negotiating a possible sale of the corporation. Therefore, we hold that the
Delayed Redemption Provision is invalid under Section 141(a), which confers
upon any newly elected board of directors full power to manage and direct the
business and affairs of a Delaware corporation.' ' 153 This is already a striking
affirmation of the importance of section 141(a) and its broad grant of authority,
which we shall see is a common theme in Delaware case law. Even more
striking, though, is the Court statement that "Section 141(a) requires that any
limitation on the board's authority be set out in the certificate of
incorporation."' 154 If we could take this sentence literally, it would seem to
settle the debate in favor of limited bylaw power.
However, we cannot take the sentence literally. Section 141(a) clearly
allows limitation as otherwise provided for in the corporation law, not just in
the certificate. Thus, under section 350 shareholder agreements can clearly
limit board authority in a close corporation. The Quickturn dictum, taken
literally, would deny that point, but to that extent, at least, the dictum is just
wrong. The key statutory question for the power of bylaws is whether section
109(b) is another one of the provisions to which section 141(a) refers.
Quickturn does not answer that question, because it does not correctly parse the
relevant statutory language. Moreover, Quickturn involves a board limiting
future board power in a context where entrenchment is a serious concern. That
context differs significantly from our context, where shareholders are trying to
150. See Invacare Corp., 968 F. Supp. at 1582 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-731(c)).
151. 721 A.2d 1281 (1998).
152. See id. at 1287.
153. Id. at 1291-92 (emphasis in original).
154. Id. at 1291.
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use the bylaws to limit a board's ability to entrench itself. Thus, like Fleming,
Quickturn is of limited use, although it is a strong example of the heavy
emphasis the Delaware courts put on board authority.
Several Delaware cases speak to the scope of the bylaw power. The oldest
and broadest of these is Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp.'5 5 Gow held
that bylaws could enlarge the size of the board despite a certificate provision to
the contrary. The court reasoned that the relevant statutory provision specified
that the bylaws set board size, and did not mention the certificate.' 56 That
specific result would not be reached today, as the contemporary law is clear
that the certificate overrides the bylaws and that the certificate can regulate any
matter that the bylaws can. 157 Of continuing interest, though, is the Chancery
Court's description of the general scope of bylaws. The court said "the by-laws
are generally regarded as the proper place for the self-imposed rules and
regulations deemed expedient for its convenient functioning to be laid
down."' 58 The case thus supports both the ordinary/fundamental matters and
procedure/substance distinctions.'
59
Two more recent cases on the scope of the bylaw power are Datapoint
Corp. v. Plaza Securities Co. 160 and Allen v. Prime Computer, Inc.161 Both
cases dealt with bylaws delaying the effectiveness of actions taken by
shareholder written consent. In analyzing these bylaws the court focused on
whether they were consistent with section 228, which allows shareholder action
by written consent. The court read that provision as not allowing a delay in the
effectiveness of action by written consent except for ministerial reasons, which
are to confirm that the written consent has been properly attained. This is thus a
relatively narrow reading of the bylaw power, even in an area (voting
procedure) that is rather close to the core of the traditional power of bylaws.
However, the court focused on a specific statutory provision, not on the general
provisions of sections 109 and 141. In that sense the cases resemble Gow.
Two other recent cases that tend to give a broad scope to the bylaw power
are Frantz Manufacturing Co. v. EA C Industries"' and Hollinger International
v. Black.16 3 In Frantz the court approved bylaw amendments that required
unanimous attendance and approval for any board action, saying "the bylaws of
a corporation are presumed to be valid, and the courts will construe the bylaws
155. 165 A. 136 (Del. Ch. 1933).
156. Id. at 139-42.
157. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109(b), 102(b)(1) (2005).
158. 165 A. at 140.
159. See supra notes 49-54, 56 and accompanying text.
160. 496 A.2d 1031 (Del. 1985).
161. 540 A.2d 417 (Del. 1988).
162. 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985)
163. 844 A.2d 1022 (Del. Ch. 2004).
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in a manner consistent with the law rather than strike down the bylaws." 164 In
Hollinger, the court held that a bylaw amendment that eliminated a special
committee was valid, although it struck down the amendment as inequitable. In
doing so, the court noted "the capacious authority over a board's processes that
§ 109 and other provisions of § 141 plainly grant."' 65 The court also noted the
ongoing scholarly debate over poison pill amendments.
Two other recent cases refer in passing to the debate over shareholder
bylaws: Jones Apparel Group, Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co. 16 6 and General
DataComm Industries, Inc. v. State of Wisconsin Investment Board.167 In Jones
Apparel the court uses the debate to point out that the Delaware General
Corporation Law is not always "a model of drafting consistency. ' 168 In General
DataComm, the Chancery Court came close to facing our issue squarely. The
case involved a proposed bylaw forbidding the board from repricing options
without shareholder approval, thus squarely raising the question of the power of
bylaws to limit board authority. However, the bylaw had not been adopted by
shareholders, it was merely proposed, and hence the court concluded that the
case was not ripe.' 69 Vice Chancellor Strine had this to say on the merits:
It may be that GDC is correct in stating that the Repricing Bylaw is obviously
invalid under the teaching of Quickturn. But the question of whether a stockholder-
approved bylaw that can potentially be repealed at any time by the GDC board of
directors exercising its business judgment ... is clearly invalid under the teaching
of a case involving a board-approved contractual rights plan precluding, by
contract, a new board majority from redeeming the rights under the plan until six
months after election seems to me to be a question worthy of careful
consideration. 170
The first sentence could suggest that Strine is inclined to find a limited
general bylaw power, but the second sentence suggests a possible inclination to
distinguish Quickturn and find a broader bylaw power when exercised by
shareholders to limit board authority.
What Delaware courts have had to say on the specific topics of shareholder
nominations and access to the proxy machinery and of poison pills is also
interesting. Of particular note for the former topic is Harrah's Entertainment v.
JCC Holding Co. 171 The case involved interpretation of a certificate provision
giving specific shareholders the power to nominate a certain number of
directors. The court wrote:
Because of the obvious importance of the nomination right in our system of
164. Frantz Mfg., 501 A.2d at 407.
165. Hollinger Int'l, 844 A.2d at 1080.
166. 883 A.2d 837 (Del. Ch. 2004).
167. 731 A.2d 818 (Del. Ch. 1999).
168. Jones Apparel Group, 883 A.2d at 846.
169. See Gen. DataComm Indus., 731 A.2d at 821.
170. Id. at 821. 1 have omitted two footnotes. The second of these quotes from the Hamermesh
article at length on the openness of the law on point.
171. 802 A.2d 294 (Del. Ch. 2002).
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corporate governance, Delaware courts have been reluctant to approve measures
that impede the ability of stockholders to nominate candidates. Put simply,
Delaware law recognizes that "the right of shareholders to participate in the voting
process includes the right to nominate an opposing slate." And, the unadorned right
to cast a ballot in a contest for [corporate] office... is meaningless without the right
to participate in selecting the contestants. As the nominating process circumscribes
the range of choice to be made, it is a fundamental and outcome-determinative step
in the election of officeholders. To allow for voting while maintaining a closed
selection process thus renders the former an empty exercise.
Even though this does not speak specifically to the question of proxy access,
given the practical importance of proxy access to effective ability to nominate,
the policy expressed in the passage clearly points in favor of allowing
shareholder access to the corporate proxy.173
The leading case concerning the power of boards to adopt poison pills is
Moran v. Household International.174 The Delaware Supreme Court held that
boards had the power to adopt basic poison pills. 175 The court relied mainly on
section 157 to validate board power to enact pills, 176 although it also briefly
pointed to section 141(a) as "additional authority."'177 This does not tell us how
the bylaws may regulate this power, however. Still, Moran, and the Unocal line
of cases, does seem to grant boards quite broad authority to set antitakeover
defenses.
Beyond these more specific cases, there are two broad lines of Delaware
cases we should note, though they point us in opposite directions. First, many
cases emphasize that section 141(a) (and its predecessors) grant boards broad
authority to manage the business of a corporation. In Aronson v. Lewis,178 the
Delaware Supreme Court said "[a] cardinal precept of the General Corporation
Law of the State of Delaware is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage
the business and affairs of the corporation."' 79 The Aronson court also noted
that "the demand requirement is a recognition of the fundamental precept that
directors manage the business and affairs of corporations."' 80 Even more
significantly, "[t]he business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the
managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors under Section 141(a)."' 181 Thus,
172. Harrah's Entm 't, 802 A.2d at 310-11 (citations omitted).
173. This case supports, at least to an extent, the argument by Mel Eisenberg cited above that
corporate proxy access is vital to shareholder exercise of their core power to elect directors. See supra
notes 115 through 116 and accompanying text; Eisenberg, supra note 115, at 1505-07.
174. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
175. "Basic" as opposed to dead hand or no hand pills, which are not valid. See Quickturn Design
Sys. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998); Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch.
1998).
176. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1351-52.
177. Id. at 1353.
178. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
179. Id. at 811 (citing DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)).
180. Id. at 812.
181. Id.
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two of the key doctrines of Delaware jurisprudence, the business judgment rule
and the demand requirement, are intimately tied to Section 141(a)'s grant of
authority to the board.
In a similar vein, the case that created Delaware's intermediate standard of
review for the adoption of antitakeover defenses also emphasized the grant of
power to the board. "The board has a large reservoir of authority upon which to
draw. Its duties and responsibilities proceed from the inherent powers conferred
by Del. C. § 141(a), respecting management of the corporation's 'business and
affairs. " 1
8 2
Another line of cases points to the importance of shareholder voting as the
leading basis for legitimizing board power. These cases tie back to the
importance of the statutory grant, discussed above, to shareholders of the power
to elect directors.' 83 The leading case in this line is Blasius Industries v. Atlas
Corp. 184 Chancellor Allen stated that "[t]he shareholder franchise is the
ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power
rests. ' 85 Therefore, "matters involving the integrity of the shareholder voting
process involve considerations not present in any other context in which
directors exercise delegated power." 186 To protect shareholder power, the court
announced that where the board has taken action for the primary purpose of
thwarting a shareholder vote, it must present a compelling justification for such
action. 187
Subsequent Delaware Supreme Court cases have not always strongly
endorsed Blasius. In Stroud, for instance, the court seemed to cabin Blasius as a
limited element within the Unocal standard of review. 8 8 However, Blasius has
survived and even thrived as a precedent for subsequent courts. Harrah's
Entertainment is one example. Another important example is MM Companies
v. Liquid Audio, Inc., in which the Delaware Supreme Court applied Blasius to
invalidate a board bylaw that expanded the number of directors in response to a
takeover-related proxy contest.' 89 Another is Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore,190 in
which the Chancery Court struck down as inequitable a board bylaw that
required a supermajority vote for shareholder bylaw amendments.
The Blasius line of cases supports an expansive understanding of the ability
of shareholders to enact bylaws limiting board power. It provides particularly
strong support for proxy access bylaws, as shareholding voting for directors is
182. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953 (Del. 1985).
183. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text; Eisenberg, supra note 115, at 1505-07.
184. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
185. Id. at 659.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 661-62.
188. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 n.3 (Del. 1992).
189. MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003).
190. 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000).
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at the core of Blasius. Finally, a variety of recent Delaware cases suggest that
the Delaware courts are taking a more skeptical view of board action, and are
doing more to protect shareholders. 191 This shift should make the courts more
receptive to arguments favoring shareholder bylaws. Several extra-judicial
comments by Delaware judges strongly point to the conclusion that those
judges believe that proxy access bylaws are valid. 192 I am aware of no such
evidence for poison pill bylaws, which remain more questionable, but even
there it seems that Delaware courts today might be more receptive to such
bylaws than Delaware courts five years ago.
Overall, legislative and judicial history do not clearly resolve the general
tension between sections 141(a) and 109(b), nor do they resolve the more
specific questions as to the validity of proxy access or poison pill bylaws. Both
broad and narrow interpretations of the bylaw power find some support in the
case law. Both text and case law point to a strong policy in favor of board
authority, but both also point to shareholder voting as both a source of the
legitimacy of that authority and as a potential limit on it. As with our textual
analysis, proxy access bylaws receive greater support from the case law than
poison pill bylaws.
V. POLICY ANALYSIS OF BYLAWS
In this section I turn to a policy analysis of what matters we should allow
bylaws to regulate. Policy matters for at least two reasons. First, as the Eskridge
and Frickey funnel suggests,' 93 judges frequently take policy into account in
interpreting statutes. They differ as to how much weight they give policy
concerns and as to how explicit they are in considering policy, but most judges
do consider it. The analysis of text, legislative history, and court cases yields
enough indeterminacy, at least with respect to poison pill bylaws, that policy
concerns are likely to receive a lot of attention from courts faced with these
issues. That analysis also suggests broad policy concerns embedded in the
statutory text and recognized by the courts, so that further analysis of how to
advance those goals is a fitting extension of the analysis of the previous section.
Second, we independently care about the policy effect of how corporate law
statutes are interpreted. If the more strictly legal analysis suggests one result
but a policy analysis suggests a different result, that is interesting for purposes
of future revision of the statutes even if the policy concerns do not affect how a
court interprets the current statutes.
191. See id. at 325-28. The leading cases are Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, 818 A.2d 914 (Del.
2003); In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003); and In re Oracle
Corp. Derivative Litigation, 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003). But see In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litigation, No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL 2055651 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005).
192. See Alison Carpenter, Delaware Chancery Jurists Tell Investors to Be Creative, Do More if
They Want Power, 2 CoRP. ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 351 (2004).
193. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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A policy analysis of corporate bylaws could potentially draw on many
different methodologies and consider the effect of competing rules on many
different goals or values. I shall narrow the scope of my analysis in a
conventional way by limiting myself to an economic analysis focused mainly,
if not quite entirely, on efficiency as a goal. This has become the standard
approach within corporate law scholarship focused on normative questions, so
although it can certainly be questioned, I will not question it here.
Even within this accepted general approach, analysts have differed
significantly as to what economic efficiency entails in setting corporation law.
The key difference I wish to flag here concerns whose interests the law should
treat a corporation as serving. The overall goal of corporation law is to have
corporations maximize the net social wealth that each corporation creates. The
prevailing view in the U.S. has been that this can be best accomplished if the
directors and officers of a corporation seek to maximize shareholder value.
194
The case law typically supports this view, both in Delaware195 and in other
states. 196 However, a significant minority in the U.S., and a majority in some
other countries, believe that the board and officers should consider and attempt
to advance the interests of a variety of stakeholders, including shareholders but
also employees, creditors, and various others.' 97 Both courts and statutes do
sometimes allow the consideration of other constituencies, though it is not clear
that such consideration can be allowed to significantly hurt shareholder
interests. 198 The arguments for and against an expansive bylaw power differ
significantly depending on whether one takes the narrower view of shareholder
primacy or the broader stakeholder approach. In this section I shall first start
with the arguments that assume a shareholder primacy norm, as that position
dominates in American scholarship and case law. However, I shall also
consider how the arguments differ if one takes a stakeholder approach, since I
194. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for
Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV.
23 (1991); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 410-29 (2002).
195. The clearest area where Delaware courts recognize shareholder primacy is in circumstances
invoking the Revlon duty. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1985).
196. The canonical cite is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
197. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145 (1932); Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283 (1998);
Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary
Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad
Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002).
198. For the expressed views of the Delaware courts, see Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
Many states, though not Delaware, have corporate constituency statutes that allow boards to consider the
interests of constituencies other than shareholders. See Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency
Statutes and Employee Governance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227, 1232-41 (2004).
Vol. 3.1, 2005
Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills
follow that approach, for reasons I shall outline briefly below.
1 9 9
A. Arguments Assuming Shareholder Primacy
An expansive interpretation of the bylaw power increases shareholder
power within the corporation because shareholders are able to amend the
bylaws without board approval or initiative. Certificate amendments, in
contrast, are initiated by the board and require board approval. Thus, if one asks
whether the bylaw power should be interpreted expansively, and if one
assumes, as we are for now, that our goal is to maximize shareholder wealth, an
obvious answer suggests itself. If shareholders wish to set the rule on a certain
topic, they should be able to do so. The corporation is supposed to be
advancing their interests, and they can judge what rules are best for them.
Consider the most obvious counter-argument and its corollary caveat. In a
public corporation with a large number of shareholders most if not all of whom
own a small percentage of the corporation's shares, it makes no sense for
shareholders to engage in ordinary decision making. The shareholders, most of
whom do not work in the corporation, lack easy access to much useful
information, and their small shareholdings give them little incentive to acquire
more information. Even if they had the needed information, they would have to
agree on what to do, and the costs of collective decision making would be
high.200 Thus, it is much more efficient for boards, or in most cases for
corporate officers under board supervision, to make ordinary business
decisions. Indeed, the advantages of centralized decision making are one of the
key attractions of the corporate form.20 1 Corporate law provides a set of off-the-
202
rack rules that provide a basic hierarchical structure. The law provides an
allocation of intra-corporate power in which shareholders are involved in very
few decisions, and in most cases this allocation makes eminent good sense.
Section 141(a) and its analog in other states is an important part of that
allocation of corporate power, as the case law has recognized.
Few if any people in the bylaw debate, or more generally the corporate
governance debate, would contest that point. Yet, the point does not end the
debate for two reasons. First, most advocates of an extensive interpretation of
the bylaw power do not argue for its extension without limit. Instead, they
argue that bylaws are mainly appropriate in matters of corporate governance, or
procedural issues. 20 3 Shareholders in public corporations will not be involved in
ordinary business decisions. The general advantage of centralized decision
making does not deny that shareholders should have some role in corporate
199. See infra Part V.B.
200. See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 89-92 (1996).
201. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 194, at 201-03.
202. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 194, at 34.
203. See the distinctions discussed supra Part III.
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governance.
Second, and more crucially, what exact distribution of powers is optimal
may differ from corporation to corporation. Corporate law can at best provide
rules that work well for most companies in most circumstances. This suggests
that if enough of the relevant affected parties can agree, then corporations
should be able to diverge from the general rules allocating powers within
corporations.
Section 141 (a) and its analogs are default rules. It is clear that the certificate
can vary the grant of power to the board. Thus, if a majority of both
shareholders and directors agree, they can amend the certificate to limit the
managerial power of the board. This reflects the benefits of having a default
rule that can be varied where individual circumstances make the general rule
unattractive.
Thus, at two ends this topic is largely uncontested. As a general rule,
applying most of the time to most questions, boards, not shareholders, have and
should have authority to make ordinary business decisions. On the other hand,
the board and shareholders together can agree to limit that usual board authority
if they choose to do so in the certificate.
The debate occurs in between these two extremes: can shareholders alter
the usual allocation of power through the bylaws rather than the certificate?
The key difference, of course, is that amending the bylaws does not require
board approval. Thus, the debate is not over what the default rule should be, or
whether that rule should be mandatory rather than default. Instead, the debate is
over how a corporation should be able to opt out of the default rule of broad
board authority.
Allowing the bylaws to regulate a matter creates a rather nuanced and
complicated opt-out mechanism. Saying that the bylaws may regulate matter X
means, as a default matter of corporate law, that shareholders by a majority
vote, on their own initiative, may set the rules for how their corporation handles
matter X, thus varying from what the default legal rules for matter X would
dictate. However, the corporation may in turn vary that mechanism for opting
out in various ways. As a default matter only shareholders may change the
bylaws, but the certificate may, and typically does, give that power to the board
as well. 204 As a default, holders of a majority of the outstanding shares
constitute a quorum, and the vote of a majority of a quorum of shareholders is
sufficient to enact a bylaw, but either the certificate or the bylaws may vary
those requirements. 205 Finally, and most importantly for the following
argument, a corporation can take matter X out of the bylaw power by setting the
204. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2005). However, the certificate may not deny the
shareholders power to amend the bylaws. See id
205. See id. §216.
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rules for matter X in the certificate. 20 6 The bylaws are subordinate to the
certificate and may not contain any provision inconsistent with the
certificate. 20 7 Thus, even if the corporate law gives shareholders the power of
initiative over matter X by allowing the bylaws to regulate matter X, the
shareholders may agree to tie their hands on matter X through a certificate
provision, so that future changes to that rule require board as well as
shareholder approval.
Our question is over what matters should shareholders have a qualified
power of initiative. Our discussion so far demonstrates that the scope of the
bylaw power rule is a default rule as to how the corporation shall opt out of
various default rules. In thinking about this topic, we might get help from the
literature on majoritarian and minoritarian default rules. 20 8 Most early law and
economics thinking about how to set legal default rules argued for a
majoritarian approach: choose the rules that a majority of the regulated agents
would choose if they could make a costless choice under conditions of zero
transaction costs.2 09 However, in a landmark article Ian Ayres and Robert
Gertner argued 210 that sometimes it might make sense to instead set penalty
default rules, to encourage persons with private information to reveal that
information to the court or to those with whom they contract, even though the
default rules so set might not be what most parties would choose if contracting
were costless.
Would the aggregated interests of shareholders and managers in most
corporations be helped or hurt by giving shareholders a broad power to regulate
corporate governance through bylaws? The key benefit from shareholder power
of initiative emerges if we consider the agency problem that centralized
management creates. We have considered the great benefits that such
centralization creates. However, such benefits come at a cost. Centralized
management separates ownership from control: shareholders are the intended
beneficiaries of corporate decision making, but the officers and directors do the
actual decision making. There is nothing to ensure that they will make
decisions in the best interests of shareholders.
A variety of legal and non-legal mechanisms help keep directors and
officers in line. These include the threat of hostile takeovers, high-incentive
executive compensation, the managerial labor market, product markets, norms,
shareholder voting, and shareholder suits for breaches of fiduciary duties. Note
206. The certificate may contain any provision that may be included in the bylaws. See id. §
102(b)(1).
207. See id. § 109(b).
208. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN L. REV.
1591 (1999).
209. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 89-90 (1989).
210. See id.
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that shareholder selling (with its effects on stock price), shareholder voting, or
both are crucial to many of these mechanisms. As Robert Thompson and
Gordon Smith have emphasized in an insightful article on "sacred space,"
shareholder oversight is crucial to maintaining and constraining board power in
various economic theories of the firm.211 The Blasius line of cases recognizes
the importance of this shareholder role.
212
The corporate governance provisions of a corporation's certificate and
bylaws should try to reduce incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior
while still providing the board and officers with the flexibility and authority
they need to run the business effectively. However, there is an obvious danger
that the directors may be able to block shareholders from putting desirable
213provisions into the certificate. Thus, allowing shareholders to put corporate
governance provisions in place without board approval has clear attractions.
Since directors are part of the problem that shareholders may be trying to
control, it would seem to make little sense to give those very same directors a
veto power over what controls shareholders can place on them. Shareholders
should be able to take self-help action to defend their right to sell shares to
outside bidders and to choose the board of directors.
214
We can see the point in more detail if we consider the two types of bylaws
that are our focus, shareholder proxy access bylaws and poison pill bylaws.
Shareholder voting for directors is a potentially important limit on director
opportunism. Voting rules can also affect the market for corporate control.
However, without access to corporate proxy materials, contested elections will
be prohibitively expensive for challengers except in the context of hostile
takeovers. Thus, shareholder voting for directors will have little effect as a
control on opportunism except insofar as it facilitates hostile takeovers.
Similarly, poison pill bylaws could bolster the effectiveness of a key limit
on opportunism, the threat of hostile takeovers. Poison pills are an important
defense against takeovers which the board does not want. The poison pill
combined with a staggered board and a ban on shareholder removal of directors
211. See Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role:
"Sacred Space" in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REv. 261, 299 (2001).
212. Seeid. at 299 n.183.
213. There is an argument that at the time a corporation goes public its certificate will contain the
optimal mix of provisions, as those owning the shares at that time will bear the costs of bad provisions,
since buyers will pay less for shares in a corporation burdened by poor corporate governance practices.
See Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). However, there is much debate over whether IPO
markets work so efficiently in practice. See Michael Klausner, Institutional Shareholders, Private
Equity, and Antitakeover Protection at the IPO Stage, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 755 (2003); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 713 (2003). Moreover, even
if the certificate is efficient at the time a corporation goes public, over time it may cease to be efficient.
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 194, at 32-34.
214. See Thompson & Smith, supra note 211, at 322-23.
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without cause makes hostile takeovers extraordinarily difficult and unlikely.
215
Poison pill bylaws allow shareholders to stop boards from erecting such a
powerful defense, if a majority of shareholders believe that defense is bad for
them.
That, then, is the core argument in favor of allowing bylaws to regulate
corporate governance under a majoritarian default rule approach: most
corporations would prefer to give shareholders broad bylaw powers as a
potential way of limiting managerial opportunism. This argument supports the
core distinction between corporate governance and ordinary business matters
that emerged from the doctrinal analysis of the previous section.
The minoritarian approach to default rules has identified several reasons
why one might want to set default rules in a way that might not reflect what
most parties would choose in a world of costless contracting. The original
reason focused on encouraging parties to a contract to reveal useful private
information.2 16 This argument might apply in our setting. Boards and officers
are the parties in the corporate contract most likely to have relevant private
information. In particular, they are most likely to know both the idiosyncratic
private benefits and the costs of unchecked managerial power in their particular
company. We might then want to force them to reveal that stronger power is
particularly important in their company by putting limits on the bylaw power
into the certificate.
Perhaps even more helpful to us is another argument for minoritarian
defaults. It may be easier to contract around some defaults than others. If so, it
may make sense to set a default that is easier to contract around, so that parties
will be more likely to do so when the default is inefficient.2 17 This also argues
for a broad bylaw power. It is easier for managers to contract around the default
rule by amending the certificate than for shareholders, since only managers
have the power to initiate changes in the certificate. It might therefore make
sense to force boards to narrow the statutory default of a broad bylaw power,
even if it turns out that most corporations do choose to do so. If a weak bylaw
power is the statutory default, shareholders are likely to have much trouble in
convincing boards to amend the certificate to strengthen shareholder power,
particularly in already-public corporations.
2 18
215. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 10.
216. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 208.
217. Seeid. at 1600-04.
218. Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani have argued along these lines that corporate law default
rules generally should be set in a way that is more rather than less restrictive of management, because
corporations are more likely to opt out of inefficient rules that overly-restrict the board than of
inefficient rules that underly-restrict it. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults
for Corporate Law Evolution, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 489, 492-93 (2002). They specifically apply their
approach to the question of poison pills. Their preferred answer is that the law should not allow
management to adopt a poison pill without shareholder ratification. See id. at 514. Failing that, though,
they suggest allowing shareholders to adopt bylaws that limit the board's ability to adopt a pill. See id. at
518. The more general issue here is the optimal "stickiness" of a default rule, an important topic which
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The remaining question is whether any counter-arguments caution against a
default power of shareholder initiative in setting rules of corporate governance.
One leading counter-argument holds that shareholders lack the information
they need to make informed corporate governance decisions. This is a good
reason for the default rule that boards, not shareholders, are responsible for
ordinary business decisions. Some argue that even in setting general rules about
corporate governance shareholders in public corporations will not be well-
enough informed to make good decisions.
Shareholders will usually be less knowledgeable than directors, and
particularly than officers. However, shareholders are also more likely to have
their own best interests at heart in voting on corporate governance rules than
are directors and officers. 2 19 Moreover, many corporate governance issues,
including poison pills and shareholder proxy access, are likely to arise at many
different corporations, raising the same general questions at each, albeit with
some company-specific variations. Shareholders are likely to be rather well-
informed on such issues. 220 That is particularly so for institutional investors,
which hold over half of all the shares in public U.S. corporations.
Another problem facing shareholder voting on bylaws is free riding and
rational apathy. Even if the SEC changes its rules and allows shareholders to
include proxy access and/or poison pill bylaws as shareholder proposals, there
will still be costs associated with making shareholder proposals. 22 1 Any single
shareholder will gain only a small fraction of those benefits. Even if the costs
of the proposals are relatively modest, they may be enough to induce all
shareholders to avoid making the relevant proposals. Moreover, even after the
proposals are made, rational apathy may induce a majority of shareholders to
fail to investigate before voting and instead simply side with management.
Thus, shareholder bylaws may have little practical effect because shareholders
will rarely use the new tool at their disposal.
It does seem plausible that shareholders will not exercise the bylaw power
frequently. However, this counterargument does not effectively caution against
allowing corporate governance bylaws, for several reasons. Shareholders do
already make shareholder proposals, with growing frequency. Nowadays many
proposals focused on corporate governance receive majority approval. That
happens even though most proposals today are merely advisory, and boards can
and frequently do ignore them. With mandatory bylaw proposals having greater
has not received enough attention. For what is still to my knowledge the best general discussion of that
topic, see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 208, at 120-27.
219. There is still some concern about special interest shareholders. See infra notes 223-26 and
accompanying text.
220. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
833 (2005); Eisenberg, supra note 115, at 1510.
221. See Robert Pozen, Institutional Perspective on Shareholder Nominations of Corporate
Directors, 59 BUS. LAW. 95 (2003).
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effect, shareholders would have more reason to expend the costs necessary to
propose them. This particular argument only suggests that shareholder
proposals will be infrequent; however, it does not indicate any problems with
those proposals that actually do pass.
222
Another counter-argument is the threat of special interest bylaws. That is,
shareholders with special interests at variance with those of other shareholders
and the corporation may try to use bylaw proposals to extract private benefits
from management. 223 A particular concern has been the role of union and
governmental pensions, which critics believe have tried to use the shareholder
224proposal mechanism for political ends. However, we can trust the board to
argue strongly against such proposals. 225 Union and governmental pensions win
on such proposals only when they propose general corporate governance
measures that have no clear special advantages to them, such as advisory
proposals to end staggered boards or poison pills.226 Unions and public sector
pensions are playing a strongly positive role in overcoming the free rider
problem among shareholders. Other large institutional investors are unwilling
to shoulder the costs of making shareholder proposals, because they do not
realize the benefits. Union and public sector pension managers are willing to
bear those costs.
Jeffrey Gordon has drawn on social choice theory to suggest another
potential problem with shareholder initiative power. If shareholders have
differing views on an array of different possible voting matters, then under
some circumstances vote cycles may be possible. That is, shareholder may
prefer proposal A to B, and B to C, but prefer C to A. Decision making could
then become incoherent and chaotic.227 This could be a problem for boards as
well, which are also a collective body, but there are far fewer directors than
shareholders in a public corporation, and discussion among directors is more
likely to lead to a consensus or near-consensus choice than among
shareholders.
Although this is a theoretical possibility, it has never struck me as likely to
be a very major practical problem for most corporations. Most shareholders
agree on their basic aim: to maximize share value. The kinds of conflicting
goals that plague political choices are far less present among shareholders.
There is an extensive literature on conditions under which shareholders would
222. See Bebchuk, supra note 220, at 43.
223. See Stephen Choi & Andrew Guzman, Choice and Federal Intervention in Corporate Law, 87
VA. L. REV. 961 (2001).
224. See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 795 (1993).
225. See Bebchuk, supra note 220, at 46; Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning
Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018 (1998).
226. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 225.
227. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach
to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347 (1991).
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be unanimous. 228 These conditions are unlikely to hold strictly in life, but we
do not need unanimity to avoid voting cycles. Single-peaked preferences, for
instance, are a sufficient condition to avoid cycling.2 29 Indeed, one of the best
argument in favor of allowing shareholders but not other constituencies such as
employees ultimate voting power within a corporation is precisely that
shareholders are less likely to disagree, so that the costs of collective action are
likely to be a lot less. 2
30
Finally, even if cycling is a serious practical problem, various mechanisms
can help reduce the problem.231 Bebchuk suggests that management counter-
proposals could do the trick.232 Advance notice bylaws may also reduce the
problem, by limiting the ability of competing parties to strategically launch
competing proposals. Limits on the ability of shareholders to call special
meetings also serve this purpose.
A final set of counter-arguments to a shareholder power of initiative
through bylaw amendments concerns various proffered reasons why
shareholders might profit from pre-commitment. Just like Ulysses binding
himself to the mast to prevent him from yielding to the temptation of the
Sirens,233 shareholders could be better off if they prevent themselves from
interfering with board decisions.
Scholars have suggested several reasons why this might be so. Marcel
Kahan and Edward Rock suggest that antitakeover provisions in the charter
may help boards negotiate a better price in an acquisition than shareholders
would be able to achieve on their own.234 If shareholders can choose to sell on
their own, collectively, without board interference, that will create an auction
mechanism, but Kahan and Rock argue that a negotiation mechanism may be
235better for selling corporations. Shareholders may receive a higher value if
they allow antitakeover provisions to prevent them from interfering with the
board's negotiations.
Note that by Kahan and Rock's own admission, this does not mean that
shareholders are always better off with antitakeover provisions. Even if the
board can negotiate a better price for shareholders, that does not always mean it
will. Opportunistic directors may use antitakeover provisions to prevent value-
enhancing acquisitions that would hurt them personally, or may use their
228. See Harry DeAngelo, Competition and Unanimity, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1981).
229. See Bebchuk, supra note 220, at 55; DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND
ELECTIONS 18 (1958).
230. See HANSMANN, supra note 200.
231. The social choice literature discusses these mechanisms under the term "structure-induced
equilibria."
232. See Bebchuk, supra note 220, at 55-56.
233. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS (1979).
234. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 12.
235. See id. at 5-8.
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negotiating powers primarily to negotiate a deal that benefits them rather than
the shareholders they represent. Thus, in some circumstances shareholders may
be better off with no or limited antitakeover provisions.236 It is an empirical
question whether antitakeover provisions help shareholders in any particular
corporation.
Here, though, we need not argue over the empirical details surrounding
their argument. Nothing in the bylaw debate calls into question Kahan and
Rock's "Madisonian" approach.237 Even if states were to allow shareholders to
regulate poison pills in the bylaws, we have already seen that corporations may
in turn limit that shareholder power if they so choose. Most significantly, if the
shareholders agree, they can build a poison pill into the certificate, or, more
modestly, enact a certificate provision that removes the ability of bylaws to
regulate poison pills. The certificate trumps the bylaws. Thus, if shareholders in
a corporation are persuaded by Kahan and Rock's argument that they are best
off binding themselves like Ulysses not to interfere, they could still do so. They
only difference is that under the expansive bylaw regime they would have to
more explicitly choose to do so. That may well make sense, though, given the
dangers of board entrenchment. If shareholders are better off binding
themselves, then let them explicitly make that decision.
Jennifer Arlen and Eric Talley present a different, rather broader and more
insidious reason for being skeptical about shareholder initiative power.
238
Directors and officers have many different means available to protect against
takeovers. Even if shareholders could on their own initiative block some of
these, such as poison pills, they could not block them all. Many defenses are
embedded within ordinary business decisions that shareholders cannot
effectively control. For instance, contracts with third parties may contain
change-of-control provisions that make takeovers more expensive, or spin-offs
and strategic acquisitions may deter tender offers.2 39 If shareholders block
officers from some defenses, they may shift instead to these unregulable
defenses. But those unregulable defenses may be more costly to shareholders
than more visible defenses, and hence it may be in the best interest of
240shareholders not to regulate even those defenses that they can.
There are several responses to Arlen and Talley. One sort of response takes
issue with their empirical judgments. Several factors may lessen the problem
236. See id. at 14-15.
237. They compare their approach to two alternatives. The "Hamiltonian" approach strongly favors
board authority over takeover bids. The "Jeffersonian" approach strongly favors shareholder approach.
Their preferred "Madisonian" approach recognizes that for some corporations board authority may be
best, while for others shareholder authority may be best, and focuses instead on allowing each
corporation to achieve its own tailored solution through corporate charter provisions. See id at 11-15.
238. See Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Shareholder Choice
(USC Law, Olin Research Paper 03-7, Apr. 2003), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=398600.
239. See id.
240. See id
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they identify. Unregulable defenses may be less costly to shareholders than
regulable defenses. Or, they may be so costly to the corporation that directors
and officers may not shift to them even if they can no longer use their current
defenses. Or, some unregulable defenses may already be so widespread that
there is not much room left for expanded use of them. A combination of such
factors may imply that at least for most public corporations shareholder
initiative power is still attractive.
Their relatively modest claim is that "an immutable, one-size-fits-all
shareholders choice rule is unlikely to improve shareholders' welfare." 241 But
shareholder initiative power in the bylaws does not create an immutable, one-
size-fits-all shareholder choice rule. Shareholders may use the bylaws to tailor
what sort of matters they will vote on. More importantly, if convinced by Arlen
and Talley that the bylaw power will lead to an unhealthy shift to other
defenses, shareholders can amend the certificate to eliminate the bylaw power
that they find objectionable. 242 Thus, where shareholder choice is objectionable,
a bylaw-centered approach does not require corporations to allow shareholder
choice.
Stephen Bainbridge has made perhaps the broadest set of arguments against
a shareholder power of initiative.243 The key advantage of centralization is that
it is impossible, or at least prohibitively expensive, to contract in advance over
all possible contingencies. Some things will happen that the corporate contract
simply does not address, and someone must have the power to decide what to
244do in such cases. Corporate managers can do the job much more efficiently.
As we have seen, this creates a new agency problem. Bainbridge argues
that having a small collective body, the board, overseeing the managerial
hierarchy is the best solution to this problem. The board has the ultimate power
to make decisions dealing with new events. Bainbridge frequently draws on the
wonderful work of Ken Arrow on organizations 245 to note that giving the
unlimited power of review over one party's decision making ultimately pushes
back the authority to the reviewing party. Arrow notes a tradeoff between
authority and responsibility: we need decision makers with authority to make
decisions quickly and efficiently, but we also need some mechanisms of
241. Id. at 1.
242. The campaign to limit the bylaws for this reason could be a bit tricky. The board should avoid
just baldly saying "If you take away the poison pill we will put in other provisions that you can't stop
and that are even worse for you." A Delaware court might well react badly to such a threatened violation
of the board's fiduciary duty. See Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc., 517 A.2d 271 (Del. Ch. 1986).
Still, well-counseled boards should find non-objectionable ways to make the point and get the certificate
amended.
243. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 194, at 197-99, 516-17; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director
Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547 (2003).
244. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 194, at 201; Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
245. See KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974).
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responsibility that hold those decision makers accountable to the interests of
246those who are supposed to benefit from their decisions.
In response to suggestions of enhanced shareholder power, Bainbridge
repeatedly turns to this authority/responsibility tradeoff. Greater accountability
to shareholders will reduce managerial authority, decreasing the gains we get
from such authority. These lost gains from authority are a bad thing, hence
increased shareholder power is a mistake.247
However, Bainbridge's argument does not prove his point. Let us take as
true the authority/responsibility tradeoff, and also the assumption that increased
responsibility will lead to decreased authority.248 The fact that there is a
tradeoff does not tell us whether we are at the most socially desirable point
currently in making that tradeoff. It will take detailed, hard analysis, and a
tough policy judgment, to evaluate it. After all, most proposals realistically on
the table today do not move to a radical world of all responsibility, no
authority. Certainly an expanded understanding of the bylaw power is very far
from moving to such a radical world. To convince us that expanded
responsibility is not desirable, Bainbridge would have to argue, among other
things, that the current system already does a good enough job of constraining
managerial opportunism. Although Bainbridge does point to the standard
economists' arguments for current constraints on such opportunism, he does
not do so in a convincing-enough way to make his point.
This is particularly so in the case of the bylaw debate. If shareholders do
not think it is appropriate for their corporation, they can structure the certificate
to suitably limit the bylaw power. Bainbridge is enough of a contractarian that
he should agree that shareholders should be able to opt out of the strong
director primacy that he advocates as the norm. 24 9 The debate then boils down
to how this opt-out mechanism should work. Bainbridge's broad arguments do
not give us much reason to choose between the moderately different opt-out
regimes of weak and strong bylaw power.
Those are the most important of the general arguments for and against a
degree of shareholder power to take initiative in setting matters of corporate
governance. 250 Although some of the arguments give some good, albeit not
246. See id.
247. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 194, at 517.
248. This assumption will not be true in all situations, by the way, even accepting the basic
tradeoff. The assumption amounts to assuming that we are on the efficiency frontier of the
authority/responsibility tradeoff, so that more responsibility means less authority. In many cases, we will
instead be away from the efficient frontier, so that it is possible to achieve greater responsibility without
any loss in authority.
249. On Bainbridge' contractarianism, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 194, at 199-200.
250. The recent debate over shareholder proxy access contains some more specific arguments
against such access, including diversion of resources, balkanized boards, and deterring qualified persons
from serving as directors. See Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the
Company's Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 Bus, LAW. 67 (2003). Lucian Bebchuk has
answered these points quite effectively, so I will not repeat those answers here. See Lucian Arye
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irrefutable, reasons to avoid some strong suggestions of shareholder choice,
none of them provide good reasons for opposing the modest degree of
shareholder choice we could achieve through an expansive interpretation of the
bylaw power to allow for bylaws regulating general matters of corporate
governance. Such a modest power provides at least some promise of helping
shareholders to limit some of the worst excesses of opportunistic directors and
officers.
It may well be that this move does not go nearly far enough. The ability to
propose and adopt bylaws will have much less practical value if shareholders
must solicit proxies on their own to pass such bylaws. Access to the corporate
proxy materials is as crucial to the prospect of creating bylaws as it is to the
prospect of shareholders nominating directors. Section V shall address that
issue. But first, we must re-examine the basic policy questions while dropping
the assumption of shareholder primacy.
B. Arguments Assuming a Stakeholder Approach
The previous sub-section took as given the shareholder primacy norm that
dominates most American corporate law and scholarship. I do not personally
accept that norm, however. I adopt a stakeholder approach-corporations
should be run to advance the interests of several important stakeholder groups
involved in the corporation. The most important stakeholder group other than
shareholders and managers is employees, with creditors also of some
importance.25'
The standard intuition supporting shareholder primacy is that shareholders
own the corporation, and hence it should be run in their interest. That intuition
does not survive the nexus of contracts approach, or more broadly the
economic approach, that has come to dominate corporate law scholarship over
the last few decades. Shareholders are just one of a number of groups that
contracts with the other groups through the corporate legal form. Shareholders
provide one input of some, but not decisive, importance, namely equity (as
opposed to debt) financing. They get certain rights of control in return, which
under current law fall rather short of standard ownership rights. The basic
theory does not give shareholders a privileged position. Those arguments do
Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 Bus. LAW. 43 (2003). In addition to
Bebchuk's arguments, note that, in contrast to the SEC's proposed proxy access regime, the bylaw
approach allows shareholders to opt out of the ability to achieve proxy access by so providing in the
certificate, a further safeguard for those who think that such access is bad for shareholders. Given this
opt-out, opponents of proxy-access bylaws must argue not only that such access is bad, but that
shareholders will for some reason be unable to understand those arguments and protect themselves by
either just voting down bad bylaws or, more strongly, by preventing proxy access in the certificate.
251. Some advocates of a stakeholder approach sweep more broadly than this, including customers,
suppliers, local communities, and even the environment as relevant stakeholders. Corporate constituency
statutes typically include many of those groups as well. However, the argument presented in the text
focuses only on employees.
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not convince me, though; for the remainder of this Section, I assume that
corporate law should promote the interests of a variety of stakeholders, not just
shareholders.
To someone who believes that employees have a major interest at stake in
the firm, the first-best solution might well be to give employees some power in
employee governance.252 That is not a politically plausible prospect in the
United States today. Thus, stakeholder advocates must argue within a second-
best world where corporate governance rules divide power between
shareholders, directors, and officers. The question in that world is as follows:
would employees (or other stakeholders one may care about) be better off with
a shift in power from the status quo to greater shareholder power, a shift to
greater board power, or is the status quo as good as it gets? If we view
corporations as a game involving managers, shareholders, and employees, then
the different groups' interests converge and diverge in complex ways, with
different alliances possible.
253
Some scholars with sympathies towards employees and other stakeholder
groups have argued against the contemporary push for greater shareholder
power, and replied that a return to a more managerialist regime would be better
for employees and other non-shareholder stakeholders.25 4 On some matters, at
least, it does seem that employees have more in common with managers than
with shareholders. For instance, in many cases hostile takeovers may threaten
the jobs of both managers and employees.25 More generally, both managers
and employees may have significant firm-specific human capital tied up in the
corporation, making exit hard. Neither managers nor employees can diversify
their jobs in the way that shareholders can diversify their portfolios. This may
make managers and employees prefer less risky projects than shareholders
would prefer. Officers who work daily with employees may come to identify
with those employees in ways that they do not with absent shareholders.
On the other hand, in other matters the interests of employees may align
more closely with those of shareholders. For instance, managers may use their
power to pursue private benefits that decrease the corporate surplus available to
both shareholders and employees. Thus, on the question of executive
compensation employees and shareholder may have a shared cause. Even on
the subject of acquisitions, frequently managers may oppose bidders who
threaten their personal power even when the acquisition would be a real boon
252. See McDonnell, supra note 198.
253. See id; John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player
Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495 (1990).
254. See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S NEWEST EXPORT
(2001); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the
Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403 (2001).
255. See Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988).
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for the corporation, leading to expanded opportunities for its employees.
256
It is very hard to decide this question in the abstract. The answer differs
from corporation to corporation, from time to time, and from one type of
decision to another. An attempt to sort through the issue in detail would go way
beyond the scope of this article, and would most likely be indeterminate in any
case.
One approach would be to look to the leading practical advocates of
employee interests, and ask what side they are taking in the battle over
corporate governance. The main professional advocates of employee interests
are unions, which represent millions of American employees. Those unions are
involved in the corporate governance battle via political lobbying and, most
visibly, via the actions of union pension plans. Union pensions have been
257leading advocates in the battle for greater shareholder power. Union pensions
led the campaign for proxy access bylaws that led to the current re-thinking of
proxy access. 258 There is some concern that greater shareholder power will lead
to special interest abuse by unions. I have already briefly argued why that is
unlikely,259 but from a stakeholderist point of view, strengthening the voice of
employee advocates somewhat would not be a bad thing at all.
At least two caveats apply to this point. First, on at least some matters
unions do seem to have sided with directors and officers against shareholders.
For instance, corporate constituency statutes and other antitakeover statutes
seem to have gotten at least some union support, although their main impetus
has usually been managers. 260 Second, union pension managers may not take
into account the full interest of union members as employees. Indeed, their
fiduciary duties require them to consider the interests of members as holders of
shares in the plans. Still, the support for limiting executive compensation and
reforming corporate governance to lessen managerialism seems to come from
the broader union movement, not just from union pension managers.
I thus tentatively conclude that an advocate of employee interests should
applaud the proposed greater use of bylaws to enhance shareholder voice. Of
the two leading sorts of proposals we have considered, proxy-access bylaws
seem more clearly defensible for employee advocates. Indeed, employee
advocates in corporations where employees have a decent ownership share
could conceivably even try to use such bylaws to give employees some seats on
261the board. Poison pill bylaws are rather more problematic because hostile
256. See Bebchuk, supra note 220.
257. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 225.
258. See Staff Report, supra note 20.
259. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
260. See Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears,
1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 95-96 (1999).
261. Occasional shareholder proposals do suggest such bylaws. See, e.g., Int'l Bus. Machs., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1135, at *6-7 (Dec. 5, 1992) (reproducing board
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takeovers have been a controversial topic, and at least some do seem to threaten
employee interests. Still, the support of union pensions for such bylaws
persuades me that those supporting a stakeholder approach should approve of
such bylaws as well, or at least have no strong reason to oppose them.
262
C. Statutory Interpretation Revisited
At the beginning of section III I noted that one can draw on many types of
sources in considering how to interpret a statute: statutory text, legislative
history, related judicial interpretations, and policy analysis. 263 The scope of the
bylaw power is a fascinating case of statutory interpretation because there are
strong arguments on both sides of the issue at each of these levels. We have
seen a tension between granting boards broad authority and using shareholder
voting to constrain the opportunism that sometimes springs from that authority.
There is at least some support for the corporate govemance/ordinary
business distinction. That is, bylaws that deal with matters of general corporate
governance should be allowed, while those dealing with ordinary business
matters should not be allowed. The analysis also provides some, though lesser,
support for the procedure/substance distinction, namely, bylaws dealing with
procedure are valid while those dealing with substantive matters are less likely
to be valid. There is also some support for both more expansive and more
narrow interpretations of the bylaw power, but this middle interpretation seems
to emerge as the best solution. The statutory analysis also suggests, though, that
before moving to apply this general distinction, one should first look to more
specific statutory provisions and see if they answer the question one way or the
other for specific bylaws.
Applying this general analysis to the two main kinds of bylaws we have
been considering, proxy access and poison pill bylaws, leads to somewhat
different specific analyses. Statutory text, case law, and policy all tend to
suggest that proxy access bylaws are valid.
Things are murkier for poison pill bylaws. Although the general corporate
govemance/ordinary business analysis from the statutory text suggests their
validity, the specific provisions of section 157 and 151 of the Delaware law
rather strongly point to such bylaws being invalid. Neither the case law nor the
representation proposal of Pedro Del Compare). Of course, persuading a majority of shareholders to
approve such a bylaw will not be easy, to say the least.
262. One can also ask how an expansive shareholder bylaw power would affect other corporate
constituencies. Probably of most interest, besides employees, would be creditors. The issue for creditors
resembles that for employees. On the one hand, hostile takeovers may damage the pre-existing creditors
of a target company by creating new debt, thus increasing the chances the company will not be able to
repay its existing debt. On the other hand, entrenched managers pursuing private interests may hurt
creditors as well as shareholders and employees. Which of these effects predominates is hard to
determine in general, and presumably varies from corporation to corporation, and sometimes even over
time for the same corporation.
263. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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policy analysis favors poison pill bylaws quite as strongly as proxy access
bylaws, but both do on the whole favor poison pill bylaws.
This leaves us with a tougher judgment call to make in the case of poison
pill bylaws. If one is a dynamic statutory interpreter, ready to rely heavily on
policy analysis d la William Eskridge or Richard Posner,264 then one should be
willing to interpret one's way around the embarrassment of section 157 and
find such bylaws valid. As a moderate textualist, I feel more constrained than
that by the text, so I face more of a dilemma. All told, I believe that the
Delaware courts should hold that poison pill bylaws are valid. The section 157-
based textual argument is murky enough, and the policy case in favor of such
bylaws is strong enough, that the policy argument persuades me.
V. THE SEC AND SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS
For bylaws to be an effective tool for shareholders interested in enhancing
controls over boards, favorable state court decisions on the validity of
shareholder bylaws affecting board authority are not enough. Shareholders who
would like to propose such bylaws must be able to present them for a
shareholder vote at relatively low cost. Since most shareholders in public
corporations always have the option of selling,265 and given the free rider
temptation we have discussed,266 if the costs of proposing and advocating a
bylaw are at all large, shareholders will not propose them. Even the threat of a
shareholder bylaw will rarely be credible.
In most public corporations this is a big hurdle. Simply mailing information
about a proposal to all shareholders is quite expensive. Most shareholders do
not attend annual meetings; instead, they vote by proxy. Soliciting proxies is
costly, both because of the large number of shareholders, and also because of
the SEC's extensive legal regulation of proxy solicitations. 267 Indeed, except
where a shareholder seeks to take over the corporation and buy a controlling
share of stock (which can be quite lucrative), it will almost never be worth it for
shareholders to engage in their own proxy solicitations to pass a bylaw
amendment.
The only way that bylaws can be a practical tool in public corporations is if
shareholders are able to use the corporation's own proxy and proxy statement
to solicit support for their bylaw proposals. The problem with that, though, is
that the board controls what goes in to the proxy and proxy statement, and if the
264. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); Richard A.
Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800
(1983).
265. I say "most" because some mutual funds engage in indexing which may, for instance, require
them to hold shares in all companies included in the S&P 500 index.
266. See supra text accompanying note 221.
267. See Rules 14a-I through 14a-15; Eisenberg, supra note 115.
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bylaw is aimed at reining in a recalcitrant board, that board is unlikely to allow
shareholders to use the company's proxy of its own goodwill.
Enter Rule 14a-8. This rule requires that under certain circumstances
companies must include shareholder proposals in their proxy and proxy
statement. Shareholders would like to be able to use Rule 14a-8 to propose
bylaw amendments. The process is cheap and simple enough that at least
sophisticated investors, particularly institutional investors, will be able to use it
fairly readily. Thus, bylaw amendments can become a practical tool of
shareholder control over boards only if the SEC interprets Rule 14a-8 to allow
shareholders to use it to propose bylaws.
As it stands, staff interpretation of several provisions of Rule 14a-8 often
blocks shareholder bylaw proposals. However, a few simple and highly
plausible changes in staff interpretation would remove the obstacles. To see
how, we must look at how Rule 14a-8 works.
Shareholders who want a proposal included in a company's proxy must
jump through some procedural hoops. They must show that they have held an
adequate number of shares for a long enough time.268 They must submit the
proposal early enough, 269 and the proposal may not be too long, including its
supporting statement. 27 Either the shareholder or a representative must attend
the meeting.271 These procedural requirements are not very tough.
If a shareholder jumps through all of the required procedural hoops, then
the company must include the proposal in its proxy and proxy statement unless
272it falls within one or more of thirteen listed exceptions. It is several of these
exceptions that cause problems for bylaw proposals. The three exceptions of
most concern are:
the bylaw is improper under state law;273
the bylaw relates to the company's ordinary business operations; 274 and
the bylaw relates to an election.275
We shall look at each of these exceptions, asking both how the SEC staff
interprets them and how it should interpret them as applied to bylaw
amendments of the type we have been discussing.
A. Proposals that Are Improper Under State Law
Rule 14a-8(i)(1) allows companies to exclude a proposal if it "is not a
268. See Rule 14a-8(b).
269. See Rule 14a-8(e).
270. See Rule 14a-8(d).
271. See Rule 14a-8(h).
272. See Rule 14a-8(i).
273. See Rule 14a-8(i)(1).
274. See Rule 14a-8(i)(7).
275. See Rule 14a-8(i)(8).
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proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of
the company's organization. ' '276 This basis for exclusion is part of the intricate
balancing of state and federal law that goes on in this area. Over the years the
SEC decided that proposals which merely suggested that the board do
something rarely violate state law; it is only binding proposals which may,
depending upon the subject matter, cause a problem. The SEC will thus rarely
treat proposals as excludable on this ground if the proposals are merely
precatory. Indeed, the SEC has built this understanding into a note to the
rule.2 77
This has led to a proliferation of precatory proposals. These are rather an
odd duck in corporate law. For one thing, boards are free to ignore them even if
the proposals pass, and boards frequently do so. It is not clear whether
precatory proposals do much to help shareholders confronting a recalcitrant
board, although presumably they do at least have some shaming power. The
impact can be more material than that: in some circumstances, ignoring a
successful precatory proposal may send a bad signal, leading to a drop in share
price. Still, precatory proposals are generally only a weak tool. Moreover, they
have only a shadowy presence in state law. Nothing in state law seems to forbid
precatory proposals, but nothing seems to provide for them either. They are a
creation of SEC interpretation, a fact which occasionally raises irritated
commentary from state decision-makers.
The weak effect of precatory proposals motivated shareholder activists to
seek out more powerful tools, which led to the bylaw amendment proposals
that are the topic of this paper. Because bylaw proposals are mandatory, the
SEC will take a much closer look at the improper under state law ground for
exclusion, and companies will typically argue for exclusion on this basis when
presented with a binding shareholder proposal. As section III made clear, the
status of bylaw proposals that arguably limit board authority, including proxy
access and poison pill bylaws, is unclear under state law. Few states have either
clear statutes or definite judicial interpretations that settle the matter. Quite
legitimate arguments exist on both sides of the question.
What can, does, and should the SEC staff do when presented with a bylaw
whose state law validity is unclear and the company argues for exclusion on
grounds of invalidity under state law? There are three basic possibilities: the
SEC can say that the company may not exclude the proposal on this ground,
that it may exclude on this ground, or that the staff is unwilling to take a
position on whether the proposal is excludable or not.
The SEC staff has taken each of these positions at different times on
various corporate governance bylaw proposals. It is not always easy to discern
276. Rule 14a-8(i)(1). Rule 14a-8(i)(2) is similar, allowing exclusion of a proposal if it "would, if
implemented, cause the company to violate any state, federal, or foreign law to which it is subject."
277. See Note to paragraph (i)(1).
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a clear pattern, and it would appear that the staff has changed tack at several
points. In the early nineties the staff seems to have been more inclined not to
permit exclusion of governance bylaws, sustaining proposals involving
shareholder representative committees,278 employee selection of directors,279
confidential voting for directors, 280 and board independence requirements.
281
However, at the same time the staff allowed companies to exclude bylaw
proposals involving shareholder representative committees that specified that
the board could not amend the bylaws.282 Starting in 1999 the staff started
declaring in many letters that it will not express any view with respect to this
ground of exclusion where there is no compelling state law precedent.283
The practical effect of this third position is a bit tricky. A no-action letter
has very limited binding legal effect. It only prevents the SEC from taking
action against that company on that particular set of facts, assuming that the
facts as the company has stated them are correct. The SEC can always change
its mind in the future, and private parties can go to court even in the particular
case covered by the no-action letter. Moreover, even if the SEC does not agree
that a proposal can be excluded, a company can always try to go ahead and
exclude anyway-the SEC may not take action, and even if it does, the
company can go to court and try to get a judge to side with it over the agency.
Nonetheless, companies almost never exclude a proposal when the staff has
rejected a no-action request, and shareholders rarely go to the trouble and
expense of going to court where the SEC has granted a no-action request. What
happens when the staff does not take a position either way? According to the
leading analysis of no-action letters:
The subtle change of position by the staff on its burden of proof rule-who bears
the risk of state law uncertainty-has and will have major consequences to
proponents of mandatory proposals: exclusion rather than inclusion. The company
is now free to omit the proposal in its mandatory form, and the proponent is forced
to either institute suit in the federal district court to compel inclusion or to drop the
mandatory aspect of its proposal.
284
If the staff has taken no position, it remains legally possible that the SEC
278. See Exxon Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 284 (Feb. 28, 1992).
279. See Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 315 (Mar. 4,
1992).
280. See Sears, Roebuck & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 375 (Mar. 16,
1992).
281. See Louisiana-Pacific Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 554 (Mar. 12,
1992). For a good overview with more detailed descriptions of the no-action letters, see ROBERT J.
HAFT, ANALYSIS OF KEY SEC No-ACTION LETTERS § 10:18 (2003).
282. See Pennzoil Co., SEC No-Action Letters, 1993 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 304 (Feb. 24, 1993,
Mar. 22, 1993); Radiation Care, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 841 (Dec. 22,
1994).
283. See Cmty. Bancshares, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 426 (Mar. 15,
1999); E. Enters., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 270 (Feb. 17, 1999); Union
Carbide Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 145 (Feb. 5, 1999).
284. HAFT, supra note 281, at 254.
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could take action if the company chooses to exclude. However, it would seem
highly unlikely that the SEC would do so, hence Haft's conclusion as to the
practical effect of the take-no-position response.
The SEC says very little to justify its position in no-action letters. The
following statements are about the best I can find. In a letter in which the staff
said it did not agree that a bylaw proposal that would force the board to
terminate defensive measures to certain tender offers unless the shareholders
approved continued opposition, the SEC letter said:
The staff notes in particular that whether the proposal is an appropriate matter for
shareholder action appears to be an unsettled point of Delaware law. Accordingly,
.... 285
the Division is unable to conclude that rule 14a-8(c)(1) may be relied upon as a
basis for excluding that proposal from the Company's proxy materials.
286
In a letter in which the staff refused to take a stance, the letter said:
There appears to be some basis for your view that Community Bancshares may
exclude the Hanson proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(1). This view is based on the
opinion of Waller Lansden Dortch & Davis that a bylaw provision authorizing the
expenditure of corporate funds, effected by shareholders without any concurring
action by the board of directors, is inconsistent with Section 141(a) of the Delaware
General Corporation Law unless otherwise provided in the company's certificate of
incorporation or the Delaware General Corporation Law. Accordingly, we will not
recommend enforcement action to the Commission if Community Bancshares omits
the Hanson proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(1).
2 87
Which approach to uncertain state law makes more sense? On its face, the
take-no-position approach shows a fitting sense of humility. State courts, not
SEC staffers, have the responsibility of interpreting state law, and state judges
are likely to be more expert on that law, particularly in the case of Delaware.
Therefore, doesn't it make sense for the SEC to admit its ignorance on state law
and not take a position on matters where significant controversy exists, and
where both sides have good arguments?
It would appear that way, but appearances can be deceiving. Remember the
practical effect of the take-no-position approach: companies will exclude the
proposals. Remember, too, the limits of shareholder willingness to bear costs in
this area. If companies choose to exclude proposals, the shareholders could
decide either to fight the exclusion in court or to prepare their own proxy and
proxy statement. However, outside of a takeover bid, shareholders will rarely
be willing to take on the costs of either of those decisions. Instead, they will let
the proposal drop, or perhaps modify it to a precatory proposal.
Consider then the practical effect of the staff's decision to take no position:
companies exclude such proposals, and shareholders do not pursue them.
Hence, the proposals do not pass. But if the proposals do not pass, there is no
way for boards to challenge questionable bylaws in state court. As a result, we
285. The numbering at the time of the present Rule 14a-8(i)(1).
286. PLM Int'l Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 575 (Apr. 28, 1997).
287. Cmty. Bancshares, SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 426 (Mar. 15, 1999).
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do not get any further state court precedents on point. Hence the state law
uncertainty remains, and hence boards in the future will be able to continue
excluding bylaw proposals. The take-no-position response is thus devastating to
the practical usefulness of bylaws.
It is also far less humble and deferential to state courts than it appears. By
keeping such bylaws from a vote, it prevents state courts from considering the
validity of bylaws. Didn't it seem strange, in our discussion of Delaware
precedent, that on this interesting, practically important, and rather fundamental
point of corporate law, in the leading corporate law jurisdiction, there was so
little relevant precedent? The SEC's willingness to allow companies to exclude
bylaw proposals goes a long way to helping explain that lack of precedent.
It would be far better, and far truer to the principles of federalism, for the
SEC staff to refuse to agree that companies may exclude proposals on Rule
14a-8(i)(1) grounds where significant uncertainty exists as to whether the
proposals are valid under the relevant state's law. First, this would allow
shareholders to judge whether the proposals are good for their companies.
Where a majority approves, but the board remains opposed enough to challenge
the resulting bylaw in court, state judges would then be able to pass on the
validity of shareholder bylaws. We would thus see much more extensive
development of the law in this area, with more expert state judges making
decisions with much more detailed reasoning than the SEC staff provides in no-
action letters.
Such an approach would allow for more diversity. Shareholders in different
corporations could reach different conclusions about what bylaws make sense
for their corporations. Judges in different states might also reach different
conclusions about what kinds of bylaws are valid. Such diversity is one of the
great benefits of federalism. It allows for more variety between corporations,
allowing them to tailor rules to their specific circumstances both in the choice
of bylaws and in the choice of where to incorporate. 28 8 It also allows for more
learning, as we can see what effect differing bylaws have.
2 89
Note that my suggestion has the effect of putting the burden of proof on the
corporation to show that the proposal is invalid under state law. If the
corporation does not succeed in convincing the staff that the proposal is invalid,
then the corporation may not exclude on that ground. This distribution of the
burden of proof has the further virtue of complying with Rule 14a-8's placing
on the company the burden of persuading the staff that a proposal can be
excluded.290
288. See Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers for Federalism in Corporate Law, 30 J. CORP. L. 99
(2005).
289. See id; Brett H. McDonnell, Getting Stuck Between Bottom and Top: State Competition for
Corporate Charters in the Presence of Network Effects, 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 681 (2003).
290. See Rule 14a-8(g).
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Thus, a small shift in interpretive practice could have a big and positive
effect on corporate practice. So long as state law in the relevant jurisdiction
remains significantly open to doubt, the staff should refuse to agree that a
company may exclude a bylaw proposal as invalid under state law. If the
invalidity is clear enough given existing law, of course the staff could allow
exclusion. But the staff should put quite a strong burden on the corporation to
show that existing law entails that the proposal is invalid.
B. Proposals that Relate to Ordinary Business Operations
Rule 14a-8(i)(7) allows companies to exclude a shareholder proposal if "the
proposal deals with a matter relating to the company's ordinary business
operations. '" 291 The SEC gives two main justifications for this exclusion. The
first it recognizes explicitly as tracking state law: management should be
responsible for ordinary business matters because it is just not practical for
292
shareholders to get involved. The second is to avoid shareholder
micromanagement of complex problems.
293
If the discussion in section III is correct, then the ordinary business basis
for exclusion closely tracks the main distinction between corporate governance
and ordinary business matters that should guide state courts in determining
what sorts of bylaws are valid. We may therefore first want to ask about the
relationship between the ordinary-business exclusion and the violates-state-law
exclusion, and thus whether the ordinary business exclusion really makes any
sense at all.
The relationship between the two bases for exclusion depends on whether a
proposal is precatory or mandatory. As we have seen, the SEC almost always
treats precatory proposals as not violating state law. Such proposals may still be
excludable because they deal with ordinary business, and the staff does
frequently exclude precatory proposals on this ground. One might question how
much sense that makes. If a proposal is merely advisory, then even if it is
beyond the ability of shareholders to adequately decide the matter, the board
can just ignore whatever shareholders say. What is the harm of letting
shareholders give some advice?
Of more relevance to us is binding proposals. The main way that
shareholders can make legally binding proposals is through bylaw amendments.
The state law question of whether a matter is a valid topic for the bylaws is
very close, if not identical, to the question of whether the matter covers
ordinary business operations. I have just argued that where a matter is
questionable under state law, the SEC staff should allow that matter to proceed
291. Rule 14a-8(i)(7).
292. See Release No. 34-40018 (May 21, 1998).
293. See id. You might be wondering if these are two distinct justifications. I am.
Vol. 3.1, 2005
Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills
to a vote, and if shareholders approve the bylaw, then the board can pursue the
matter in state court if it chooses. The same logic applies here.
How have corporate governance matters fared under the ordinary business
exclusion? Where the proposal is framed as a bylaw, they run into the problem
of the 14a-8(i)(1) exclusion that we discussed in the previous sub-section.
However, where shareholders have framed the proposal as mere advice, that
objection goes away, leaving the ordinary business exclusion as the leading
source of contention. The SEC's staff has treated most corporate governance
matters as not excludable under 14a-8(i)(7), although there has been some
uncertainty and wobbliness as to what counts as a corporate governance
matter. 294 Proposals concerning executive compensation, golden parachutes,
and the independence and choice of auditors, for instance, were once
excludable, but now are not. 295 Robert Haft discusses a wide variety of
shareholder proposals that arguably touch on corporate governance matters. His
discussion shows how the SEC has generally drawn a line that is discernible
and sensible in its broad outlines, though certainly rather murky and hard to
rationalize or predict near the boundary of the corporate governance/ordinary
296business distinction.
What about the two specific types of bylaws that are our special concern,
poison pills and shareholder access? The SEC has generally held not
excludable precatory poison pill proposals that call for the redemption of pill
297plans. This agrees with our discussion of pill bylaws under state law, where I
argued that such bylaws appear valid under the corporate governance/ordinary
business distinction, although more specific provisions of state law may call
their validity into question.298 As for shareholder access bylaws, the SEC has
given relatively little guidance in applying the ordinary business exception to
them because, as we shall see shortly, it has generally allowed those proposals
299to be excluded on a different ground. Our discussion of shareholder access
bylaws under state law suggests that they are a matter of corporate governance,
not ordinary business, and hence should not be excluded on this ground.
Thus, although I have questioned whether the 14a-8(i)(7) ordinary business
basis for exclusion makes sense, even if one does not jettison it and applies
current SEC staff interpretation on the point, this basis should not present a
reason for excluding corporate governance bylaws.
294. See HAFT, supra note 281, § 10:3.
295. See id.
296. See id.
297. Seeid. at 215-16.
298. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
299. See infra Part V.C.
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C. Proposals that Relate to an Election
Rule 14a-8(i)(8) allows a company to exclude a proposal if "the proposal
relates to an election for membership on the company's board of directors or
analogous governing body." 300 For most corporate governance bylaws this is
not an issue, but for bylaws granting shareholders access to the company proxy
and proxy statement for the purpose of nominating director candidates, this
ground for exclusion is crucial. Indeed, the SEC's staff has generally allowed
301companies to exclude shareholder access proposals on this ground, with an
occasional exception. 30 2 As we saw above, the Commission staff most recently
wobbled on this point with the Disney proposal in late 2004, but its final
position there reverted to the standard line of allowing exclusion. 30 3 As we saw
in the background section, SEC reconsideration of its approach to this basis for
exclusion led to the proposal of Rule 14a-1 1.314 In thinking about the wisdom
of the SEC's current treatment of 14a-8(i)(8), we will also have to consider this
rule's relationship with proposed Rule 14a- 11.
Rule 14a-l 1 would impose one regime on all companies in which
shareholder access for nominating directors is triggered. 305 That one-size-fits-
all approach has three major disadvantages relative to allowing shareholders to
propose company-specific rules in the bylaws. First, a company-specific
approach through bylaw proposals would allow tailoring to the specific
circumstances of individual companies. Companies differ in many relevant
ways: size, number of shareholders, concentration of shareholding, quality of
management, vulnerability to takeovers, and so on. The rule for how many
shares one must hold, and for how long, in Rule 14a- 11 would probably be too
hard for some companies and too easy for others. The Rule thus would lack the
flexibility that is one of the key advantages of the general enabling approach of
American corporate law.
30 6
Second, by allowing differing bylaws in differing companies we could in
effect perform a large experiment with shareholder proxy access for board
elections. The huge debate over Rule 14a- 11 revealed large differences over
how to best calibrate the rules even among those sympathetic to shareholder
access. Making it too hard to nominate shareholders would eliminate most of
300. Rule 14a-8(i)(8).
301. See HAFT, supra note 281, at 224; Merck & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 SEC No-
Act. LEXIS 185 (Jan. 25, 2004); Citigroup, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 160
(Jan. 31, 2003); Unocal Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 246 (Feb. 8, 1991).
302. See HAFT, supra note 281, at 249; Union Oil Co. of Cal., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 1958 (Feb. 24, 1983).
303. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
305. There are two triggers: if a majority of shareholders votes in favor of being covered by Rule
14a-11, or if at least 35% of shareholders withhold their vote from a board-nominee for director.
306. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 194.
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the gains from shareholder access, but making it too easy to nominate
shareholders could lead to an explosion of expensive contested elections, or at
least of nuisance nominations. What rules for proxy access best balance these
concerns? The best way to answer that question is to allow different companies
to experiment with different rules, and learn from their experiences.
Third, allowing bylaw proposals in this area would allow state law on
bylaws and proxy access to evolve. We have already discussed some of the
307benefits of this. State courts, especially in Delaware, can add their own
wisdom on the topic of the proper division of power between shareholders and
boards. Moreover, insofar as states differ in how they answer this question,
then that creates yet more potential for learning and tailoring, as the choice of
where to incorporate will give companies a choice between various options.
308
In its Staff Report issued as part of the reconsideration of the approach to
shareholder proxy access, 30 9 the staff considered as one option amending or
reinterpreting rule 14a-8(i)(8) to allow proposals to amend the bylaws to allow
shareholders to use the company proxy to nominate directors. The staff noted
some of the strengths of this approach, but also noted several concerns. One
concern was with whether boards would be forced to respond to shareholder
proxy access proposals, i.e., whether such proposals could be binding rather
than advisory under state law. 310 have answered above that proxy access
bylaws are pretty clearly valid under state law.
3 11
A second concern is that "it is unclear whether companies could avoid
implementing this type of proposal by amending their governing instruments to
require board approval of shareholder nominees." 3 12 There are two governing
instruments that boards might attempt to amend, the bylaws and the certificate
of incorporation. The board can amend bylaws on its own in most
corporations. 313 It is an open, and rather puzzling, question in Delaware
whether the board may amend a shareholder-passed bylaw where the bylaw on
its own terms states that the board may not do so. In states that follow the
Model Business Corporation Act, the Act clearly provides that the board may
not do so.3 14 The Delaware statutes provide no clear answer, and no case has
yet squarely addressed the question, although there are dicta in both
307. See supra notes 288-89 and accompanying text. For a similar argument as to the benefits of
allowing proxy solicitations in this area, see the prepared statement of Jill E. Fisch before the SEC
Roundtable Discussion on Proposed Security Holder Director Nomination Rules, available at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dir-nominations/fisch03/204.pdf.
308. See McDonnell, supra note 288; McDonnell, supra note 289.
309. See Staff Report, supra note 20.
310. See id. at 29.
311. See supra Part IV.C.
312. See Staff Report, supra note 20, at 30.
313. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2005) (certificate of incorporation may confer upon
board the power to adopt, amend, or repeal bylaws). Most corporations so provide.
314. See MOD. Bus. CORP. AcT § 10.20(b)(2) (1984).
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directions. 315 Even if Delaware courts hold that boards have the power to repeal
such shareholder bylaws, there are legal and practical limits to that board
power. If the board uses the power inequitably, the Blasius line of cases can be
invoked to stop such action.316 Alternatively, shareholder bylaws may set
procedural roadblocks on board attempts to amend corporate bylaws.
317
Practically, I doubt whether boards would want so blatantly to counter
shareholder desires as to repeal a board-limiting bylaw that shareholders had
recently passed. The other governing instrument that boards could amend is the
certificate of incorporation. This, however, requires shareholder approval. For
already-public corporations, amending the certificate in a way that hurts
shareholders may be difficult in today's climate of increased shareholder
activism. For not-yet-public corporations, there is much debate as to whether
the IPO market will adequately price the likely effects of provisions that hurt
shareholders. The traditional answer has been that such provisions will be
reflected in the offering share price,318 although some now question that
answer.
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The third main concern is the potential for "an array of confusing company-
specific rules., 320 Several considerations suggest this concern is not too
worrying. First, the shareholder activists most likely to introduce successful
proposals are typically sophisticated and well-informed, generally institutional
investors with good legal counsel. Second, in many cases the shareholders
seeking to use a nomination procedure will be those who introduced that
procedure in the first place. Third, there are a fairly limited number of active
shareholders likely to introduce successful proposals, and those shareholders
will presumably introduce similar proposals, perhaps with a few variations, at
many different companies. Finally, my years in practice taught me that
transactional lawyers almost never start writing with a blank page. Even
lawyers who have not previously drafted a proposal will use the proposals of
others as a model. The likely outcome is thus that there will be some real
variety-variety, after all, is essential to the gains from tailoring and learning-
but that variety is unlikely to be so great as to lead to a disabling degree of
confusion.
315. See Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat'l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 929 (Del. 1990) (suggesting
shareholder bylaw may not prevent later board bylaw from amending or repealing it); Gen. DataComm
Indus. v. State of Wis. Inv. Bd., 731 A.2d 818, 821 n.1 (Del. Ch. 1999) (appearing to lean toward same
position). Contra Am. Int'l Rent A Car v. Cross, No. 7583,1984 WL 8204, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 9,
1984).
316. See supra notes 184-92 and accompanying text.
317. See Coffee, supra note 4; John C. Coates IV & Bradley C. Faris, Second-Generation
Shareholder Bylaws: Post-Quickturn Alternatives, 56 BUS. LAW. 1323, 1368 (2001).
318. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 213.
319. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers,
89 CAL. L. REV. 1301 (2001).
320. StaffReport, supra note 20, at 30.
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Thus, the SEC would be wise to change its approach to Rule 14a-8(i)(8)
and allow shareholders to propose bylaws allowing shareholders to nominate
directors through the company proxy in specified situations. This would be
better than the proposed Rule 14a- 11, although it could also be done in addition
to proposed Rule 14a-11.
A final technical question concerning the relates-to-an-election exception
concerns whether the SEC or its staff may simply re-interpret the current rule
or whether the text of the exception needs to be revised in order to require
inclusion of shareholder nomination bylaws. The current rule allows exclusion
if "the proposal relates to an election for membership on the company's board
of directors." 321 At first glance, this language seems to rather clearly cover
shareholder nomination bylaws, which relate to elections, thus suggesting that
the rule needs to be re-written. However, there is a decent textual argument to
the contrary. The current language refers to proposals that relate to an election.
A bylaw does not relate to any one specific election. Rather, it sets procedural
rules for every board election. The word "an" thus suggests that we can, maybe
even should, read the rule to allow exclusion only of proposals that try to
specifically influence one particular election, e.g. by proposing a slate of
nominees in the proposal itself. This reading of the rule would allow the staff to
require the inclusion of shareholder nomination bylaws without revising the
rule. I think that it is plausible enough to allow the SEC to act without formal
rulemaking, although it would probably be procedurally sounder to amend the
rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
We see that an expansive, although not unlimited, shareholder power to
enact bylaws is both plausible under Delaware's statutory scheme and desirable
as a policy matter. Shareholder bylaws that set general rules of corporate
governance and procedure, such as those concerning poison pill redemption
and proxy access, should be valid unless more specific statutory provisions
remove a specific matter from the bylaw power. The SEC should revise its
interpretation of Rule 14a-8 to require boards to include bylaw proposals unless
the particular proposal is clearly invalid under state law.
Shareholders and directors have interests that often overlap but sometimes
conflict. They are involved in a never-ending project to craft corporate rules
that advance their mutual interests and thereby expand the corporate pie, while
each side simultaneously tries to grab as much of that pie for itself as it can,
even if that sometimes means decreasing the overall size of the pie. That never-
ending project occurs within individual corporations, within each state, and at
the federal level in the SEC, in Congress, and elsewhere. If Delaware and the
321. Rule 14a-8(i)(8).
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SEC follow the suggestions of this paper, shareholder bylaws will not
completely redefine this landscape. However, they will give shareholders a new
and useful tool, one that should work to increase the size of the pie that
American corporate law helps generate.
